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Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) Section 2-207 (section 2-207) affords 
commercial law professors an opportunity to engage law students in statutory 
interpretation.1  The section introduces students to the complexities and 
ambiguities that often reside in statutes notwithstanding drafters’ best efforts to 
achieve clarity.  The study of section 2-207 also acquaints students with how 
courts interpret the language of a U.C.C. provision that has been characterized 
as a “quagmire,”2 “incomprehensible,”3 and a “statutory disaster whose every 
word invites problems in construction,”4 and criticized for the waste resulting 
from the litigation the section has spawned.5  An introduction of section 2-207 
in law school also provides emergent commercial law attorneys with familiarity 
that may be beneficial when they enter practice and tackle legal disputes or 
structure sales transactions that implicate the section. 
Indeed the idea for this Article originated in my teaching of section 2-207 in 
a Contracts class.  Students and I discussed Paul Gottlieb & Co. v. Alps South 
Corp.,6 which addresses when a disclaimer of consequential damages clause on 
the reverse side of a seller’s standardized form constitutes an additional term that 
materially alters the parties’ agreement.7  The Gottlieb court stated that the 
buyer, the party seeking to exclude the additional term from the contract, failed 
to carry its burden to establish that the clause would materially alter the contract 
if included, given that the buyer proffered no evidence of either surprise or 
hardship.8 
                                                 
 1. Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2678, 2679 
(2000) (stating that section 2-207’s incomprehensible nature makes it an excellent, yet challenging 
tool to teach about “intricacies of statutory construction”). 
 2. See Corneill A. Stephens, Escape from the Battle of the Forms: Keep it Simple, Stupid, 11 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 234 (2007). 
 3. See Keating, supra note 1, at 2679. 
 4. Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A 
Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1224 (1982). 
 5. Id. at 1248. 
 6. 985 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
 7. See id. at 4, 6. 
 8. Id. at 7–8. 
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However, a student questioned the court’s holding.  The student had assumed 
that, given the importance of an aggrieved buyer’s recovery of consequential 
damages, a disclaimer of such damages would constitute a per se material 
alteration of the contract obviating the necessity of the court engaging in a facts-
based analysis.  Other students shared this view and extended their reasoning to 
disclaimer of warranty provisions that frequently appear in a seller’s acceptance 
or confirmation document.  Certain students also expressed surprise that courts 
would engage in fact-based analyses in determining the materiality of any 
additional term that strips buyers of important rights implied into the party’s 
contract by U.C.C. Article 2’s default rules.  The students’ comments regarding 
these and other clauses resulted in a lively discussion of incorrect assumptions 
as to when an additional term materially alters a contract and the approaches 
courts take when making this determination. 
In an effort to provide some clarity on when an additional term constitutes a 
material alteration, this Article examines ninety-four cases decided between 
January 1, 2005 and July 1, 2015.9  The survey reveals that the nature and extent 
of a court’s inquiry as to whether a provision materially alters an agreement turns 
on several factors including: (1) the subject matter of the additional term; (2) the 
test adopted for determining materiality; (3) the conduct of the parties, 
particularly course of dealings; (4) whether the repetitive sending of forms gives 
rise to a course of dealing; and (5) the language of Official Comments three, 
four, and five to section 2-207. 
                                                 
 9. The primary source for finding cases was Westlaw.  Section 2-207 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code Case Digest was also reviewed for cases discussing whether an additional term 
materially altered the contract.  Cases that discussed additional terms but did not engage in a section 
2-207(2) analysis to determine whether an additional term should become a part of the contract 
were not included in the ninety-four cases examined.  Also, cases involving different rather than 
additional terms were not included.  Cases are grouped according to the nature of the additional 
term that is at issue.  In instances where a court examined more than one additional term (e.g., 
disclaimer of warranty and a limitation of remedy provisions), the cases are discussed in the section 
of the article that examines each provision.  These cases were only counted once, however, for 
purposes of the total of ninety-four cases reviewed.  Cases that were reviewed but are not discussed 
in detail relate to indemnification, choice of law, non-assignment, statute of limitations, and 
integration clauses.  See, e.g., Carr v. Weinig, No. 5:01-CV-1514(HGM/GJD), 2006 WL 2355867, 
at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2006) (discussing materiality of indemnification clause); Borden Chem., 
Inc. v. Jahn Foundry Corp., 834 N.E.2d 1227, 1230 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (discussing materiality 
of indemnification clause); C9 Ventures v. SVC-West, L.P., 202 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1487 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2012) (discussing materiality of indemnification clause); Greer v. T.F. Thompson & Sons, 
Inc., No. CV-10-0799-PHX-SMM, 2011 WL 175889, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 19, 2011) (discussing 
choice of law provision); Trans-Tec Asia v. M/V Harmony Container, 435 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1017 
(C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 518 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing choice of 
law provision); ISRA Vision, AG v. Burton Indus., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d 638, 647 (E.D. Mich. 
2009) (addressing a non-assignment clause); Packgen v. Berry Plastics Corp., 973 F. Supp. 2d 48, 
50 (D. Me. 2013) (addressing statute of limitations issue); Plastech Engineered Prods. v. Grand 
Haven Plastics, Inc., No. 252532, 2005 WL 736519, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. March 31, 2005) 
(addressing integration clause). 
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Section I(A) of the Article provides an overview of section 2-207, beginning 
with a discussion of the types of transactions in which battle-of-forms issues 
invoke section 2-207.  Section I(B) then examines contract formation under 
section 2-207, focusing on the common law’s “mirror image” and “last shot” 
rules that section 2-207 displaces.10  Section I(C) initially discusses sections 2-
207(2)(a) and (c), which govern the means by which an offeror can preclude the 
incorporation into a contract of additional terms contained in an offeree’s 
acceptance or confirmation.11  Section I(C) also establishes the predicate for a 
discussion of section 2-207(2)(b) and the material alteration concept included 
therein. 
Part II begins with a discussion of the surprise or hardship test employed by 
courts to determine if an additional term materially alters the contract.  It is 
followed by an attempt to define surprise and hardship. The Article then 
discusses issues that emerge from the application of the surprise or hardship test, 
including whether hardship is an independent test for determining materiality, 
the role of course of dealing in determining materiality, and whether the repeated 
sending of forms containing an additional term operates as a course of dealing 
in regard to § 2-207(2)(b).  Part II also summarizes the findings from the survey 
of ninety-six cases decided over the last decade in which courts have addressed 
when an additional term materially alters parties’ contract.12  The survey exposes 
the inaccuracy of certain assumptions as to when an additional term will be 
included or excluded from parties’ agreements.  For example, arbitration and 
disclaimer of warranty clauses do not constitute per se material alterations.13 
Additional observations drawn from the survey include the: (1) adoption by 
the majority of courts of the unreasonable surprise or hardship test to determine 
materiality, notwithstanding arguments that hardship is a consequence of 
surprise;14 (2) imposition of the burden of proving materiality on the party 
seeking to exclude the additional term;15 (3) increased adoption and application 
of a facts-based case-by-case approach, with limited exceptions, in assessing 
materiality;16 (4) frequent application of course of dealings to negate surprise;17 
and (5) a split among the jurisdictions on whether the repetitive sending of a 
form containing the additional term gives rise to a course of dealing.18 
Part III analyzes six clauses that frequently appear as additional terms in 
acceptance and confirmation documents, which include: (1) arbitration;19 (2) 
                                                 
 10. See infra Section I.B. 
 11. See infra Section I.C. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra text accompanying notes 200–03. 
 14. See infra Section II.A. 
 15. See infra text accompanying notes 106–10. 
 16. See infra text accompanying notes 163–66. 
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 115–18. 
 18. See infra text accompanying notes 154–61. 
 19. See infra Section III.A. 
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disclaimer of warranties;20 (3) limitation of remedies, including consequential 
damages;21 (4) forum selection;22 (5) attorney’s fees;23 and (6) pre-judgment 
interest upon a buyer’s default.24  The survey concludes that, except for forum 
selection and pre-judgment interest clauses, courts have gravitated toward 
rejecting a per se approach in favor of a case-by-case approach in which the facts 
of a particular case are assessed in determining unreasonable surprise or 
hardship.25  It also reveals that most courts wisely refrain from strictly adhering 
to the guidance set forth in comments 4 and 5 of section 2-207, which pertain to 
when a clause is likely or unlikely to materially alter.26 
I.  OVERVIEW OF SECTION 2-207 
A.  The Applicability of Section 2-207 
Section 2-207 was drafted for a world of contracting that relies largely on 
contract formation arising from an exchange between parties of standardized 
form documents rather than parties sitting down and hammering out the terms 
of their contract and signing a single document.27  This is due in part to the reality 
that contracting for goods often occurs quickly and involves repeated sales and 
purchases of similar goods between parties who are at a distance.28  Section 2-
207 was promulgated, in part, to attempt to deal with these realities.29 
Contractual behavior that invokes section 2-207 might resemble the 
following.  A buyer sends to a supplier an email containing a request for 
proposals.  The supplier responds by emailing a price quote, which typically will 
not constitute an offer.30  Under this scenario, an offer would arise when the 
buyer emails or otherwise communicates a purchase order in response to the 
supplier’s price quote.  The buyer’s purchase order will likely consist of a form 
                                                 
 20. See infra Section III.B. 
 21. See infra Section III.C. 
 22. See infra Section III.E. 
 23. See infra Section III.D.2. 
 24. See infra Section III.D.1. 
 25. See infra Part IV. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See Robert P. Wise, Finding the Mississippi UCC Sales Contract Amid the RFQ, Quotes, 
Phone Calls, Emails, Purchase Order and Acknowledgment Forms, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 491, 496 
(2012) (noting that modern contract formation “depends on an informal exchange of forms”). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See Keating, supra note 1, at 2682. 
 30. Nordyne, Inc. v. Int’l Controls & Measurements Corp., 262 F.3d 843, 846 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(finding that a price quote will only constitute an offer when it’s made sufficiently clear that its 
acceptance will form a contract); James G. Raphelson & Jane D. Quasarano, Dueling, Dickering, 
and Delivering: UCC Battle of the Forms in Manufacturing Contracts, 93 MICH. B.J., no. 10, Oct. 
2014, at 29 (noting that absent specific circumstances, such as a price quote that contains specific 
quantities and an indication that it’s for the buyer’s immediate acceptance, price quotes are typically 
construed as an invitation for an offer rather than an offer); Wise, supra note 27, at 497. 
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document that contains “dickered” terms, which are the “essential terms over 
which” the parties expressly negotiate,31 such as the identification of the product, 
quantity, price, and delivery terms.32  The purchase order would also likely 
contain preprinted standard terms, “boilerplate” provisions,33 relating to a range 
of matters, such as warranties and remedies.34 
In response to the buyer’s purchase order, the seller might send an 
acknowledgement, invoice, or another standardized form document that 
contains dickered terms that match those contained in the buyer’s purchase 
order.35  The seller will likely attempt, however, to add terms to the transaction.  
To accomplish this, the seller’s acknowledgment form or invoice will include 
boilerplate provisions relating to a range of matters, such as attorney’s fees in 
the event of the buyer’s nonpayment, mandatory arbitration, and disclaimers of 
implied warranties and consequential damages.36  As discussed infra, under 
section 2-207, the exchange of forms constitutes a contract between the parties.37 
Of course, section 2-207 governs transactions that do not track the contracting 
behavior described above.  In addition to the above scenario, a seller might begin 
the process by communicating numerous quotations to potential buyers.38  
Section 2-207 is also relevant where the supplier sends the first form (e.g., an 
acknowledgement), which creates an offer that the buyer accepts by sending a 
purchase order.  Similarly, section 2-207 will apply where parties reach an oral 
agreement that is followed by one or both of the parties sending confirmations.39  
Although the courts are split, some courts hold that section 2-207 applies where 
a seller responds to a buyer’s purchase order by shipping the goods with an 
                                                 
 31. See Stephens, supra note 2, at 236. 
 32. See Wise, supra note 27, at 496 (stating that once the buyer receives the seller’s price 
quote, the buyer will issue a more detailed purchase order by adding terms relating to product 
options, price, delivery dates, or industry standards in an attempt to specify the buyer’s expectations 
regarding the seller’s performance). 
 33. See Stephens, supra note 2, at 236. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Wise, supra note 27, at 496.  Buyers typically send the form document, which is a 
purchase order, and sellers can respond with an acknowledgment or invoice.  Id.  Courts have 
provided examples of what is and is not a dickered term.  See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. G. 
Siempelkamp GmbH & Co., 29 F.3d 1095, 1098–99 (6th Cir. 1994); Gardner Zemke Co. v. 
Dunham Bush, Inc., 850 P.2d 319, 323–24 (N.M. 1993). 
 36. Wise, supra note 27, at 496. 
 37. See infra text accompanying notes 58–59. 
 38. See Wise, supra note 27, at 498. 
 39. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).  Section 2-207(1) reads 
in its entirety as follows: 
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent 
within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional 
to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made 
conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. 
Id.; see also Cent. Bag Co. v. W. Scott & Co., 647 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Sw. 
Eng’g Co. v. Martin Tractor Co., 473 P.2d 18, 26 (Kan. 1970). 
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acknowledgment form or invoice that either accompanies the shipment of goods 
or is sent shortly after the goods are shipped.40  In addition, section 2-207 applies 
where one party makes an oral offer to which the recipient responds by 
forwarding a standardized form that constitutes an acceptance.41  Moreover, 
instead of the parties exchanging their documents by email with forms attached, 
one or both of the parties may include in their emails links to sites containing 
their respective terms and conditions.42  Finally, contract formation may occur 
by virtue of an electronic data interchange (“EDI”).43  Notwithstanding the 
precise way in which documents are communicated between the parties, section 
2-207’s rules governing contract formation may be pertinent.  Equally relevant 
are the section’s rules that determine the terms governing the parties’ contract.44 
B.  Section 2-207 and Contract Formation 
1.  The Common Law’s “Mirror Image” and “Last Shot” Rules 
Section 2-207 was promulgated with the intention of changing the common 
law approach to both the formation and terms of a contract entered into through 
the use of standardized forms.45  In regard to contract formation, section 2-207 
altered what was characterized as the common law’s “mirror image rule.”46  
Under this rule, unless the terms of the offer and the purported acceptance 
matched (i.e., the terms of the offer were the “mirror image” of the purported 
acceptance), no contract was formed.47  To illustrate, assume that a buyer sent a 
purchase order and the seller responded with an acknowledgment.  The dickered 
terms of the seller’s acknowledgment matched the dickered terms of the buyer’s 
offer but the seller’s boilerplate terms included a disclaimer of warranties, a 
matter not addressed in the buyer’s offer.  Under the common law mirror image 
rule, the seller’s acknowledgement gave rise to a counteroffer.48  In this scenario 
and the scenario detailed below, section 2-207 alters the common law approach 
                                                 
 40. Rocheux Int’l of N.J., Inc. v. U.S. Merchants Fin. Grp., Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 651, 678 
(D.N.J. 2010) (acknowledging cases in which transactions were consummated in this fashion and 
the split among the jurisdictions on this issue). 
 41. Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1163–66 (6th Cir. 1972); Apex LLC 
v. Sharing World, Inc., 206 Cal. App. 4th 999, 1011 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). 
 42. See, e.g., Leica Geosystems, Inc. v. L.W.S. Leasing, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1196 (D. 
Colo. 2012) (illustrating a scenario where a document contained links to terms and conditions on a 
website). 
 43. See generally Stephens, supra note 2, at 235 (noting the standard form documents now 
appear in both electronic and paper media). 
 44. U.C.C. § 2-207(2), (3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 45. Keating, supra note 1, at 2682–83 (stating section 2-207 deals with whether and when 
contract formation occurred, as well as which party’s non-immediate terms control). 
 46. Id. at 2684. 
 47. Stephens, supra note 2, at 237. 
 48. See, e.g., Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 110 N.E. 619, 620 (N.Y. 1915). 
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by making the seller’s acknowledgement an acceptance rather than a 
counteroffer.49 
Section 2-207 also sought to alter a common consequence of the mirror image 
rule—the “last shot rule.”50  Consider the above illustration.  Assume that the 
seller sent their acknowledgment and then shipped the goods, which the buyer 
received, accepted, and paid for.  Under the common law, a contract was formed 
pursuant to the buyer’s conduct in having accepted the goods and, in turn, the 
seller’s counteroffer.51  Having accepted the seller’s counteroffer through their 
acceptance of the goods, the buyer was bound by the terms set forth in the 
seller’s acknowledgment form notwithstanding a lack of awareness of the 
boilerplate terms.52  Under the common law’s last shot rule, the party who sent 
the last form, often the seller, dictates the terms governing the transaction.53 
2.  Displacing the “Mirror Image” and “Last Shot” Rules 
The changes wrought by section 2-207 were intended to address concerns that 
the common law’s mirror image and last shot rules permitted a party to renege 
on what both parties believed constituted their contract54 and the unfairness of 
permitting the party who sent the last form to control the terms of the contract 
given the absence of an agreement in fact on those terms.55  Therefore section 2-
207 was intended to address the last shot rule’s tendency to ignore the actual 
bargain into which the parties had entered.56  Section 2-207 was promulgated 
                                                 
 49. Brown Mach. v. Hercules, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 416, 420–21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). 
 50. See Stephens, supra note 2, at 237–38. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 238. 
 53. Caroline N. Brown, Restoring Peace in the Battle of the Forms: A Framework for Making 
the Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-207 Work, 69 N.C. L. REV. 893, 902 (1991) (noting that 
under the common law rule, the offeree became the master of the commercial contract created 
pursuant to an exchange of forms). 
 54. Keating, supra note 1, at 2684 (“Because a purported acceptance such as the seller’s is 
treated as a counteroffer that is then accepted by the buyer’s performance, the seller’s terms will 
govern by virtue of its having fired the ‘last shot.’”). 
 55. Keating, supra note 1, at 2684. Professor Keating also argues that the common law 
approach to the battle of the forms 
turns contract law on its head. This is a deal in which the parties recklessly, if not, 
knowingly, consummate a sale of goods without having settled on all of the terms. And 
while one could argue that every contract is incomplete at some level, what distinguishes 
the battle of the forms case is that these contracts are most often incomplete at very 
fundamental levels. 
Id. at 2679; see also Stephens, supra note 2, at 239 (arguing that the last shot rule encourages parties 
to engage in gamesmanship and bounds parties to unread terms that both parties had often ignored, 
thereby forcing an agreement on them to which neither had agreed). 
 56. Brown, supra note 53, at 899 (noting that section 2-207 fosters the U.C.C.’s broad policy 
of effectuating the intent of parties and removing technical rules that inhibit that policy); Stephens, 
supra note 2, at 240. 
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with the intent of fostering the bargain in fact between the parties and to conform 
to commercial realities.57 
Section 2-207(1) displaces the common law’s mirror image rule by allowing 
an offeree’s responsive document to constitute an acceptance, even though the 
boilerplate terms therein are not identical to the terms of the offer.58  Returning 
to our scenario, under section 2-207, rather than giving rise to a counteroffer, the 
seller’s acknowledgment would constitute an acceptance.59  If a buyer’s offer is 
silent as to certain matters, additional terms, such as arbitration and disclaimer 
of warranties provisions appearing in the seller’s acknowledgment, will not 
defeat contract formation.60  The same would not be true if the offer contains 
dickered terms not addressed in the acceptance.  An acceptance by stating “yes” 
is assent to all of the offer’s terms, even if not repeated in the acceptance.61  
Therefore, additional terms only implicate section 2-207 when they appear in 
the acceptance or confirmation.  Moreover, the seller’s acknowledgment 
constitutes an acceptance of the buyer’s purchase order even if the boilerplate 
terms of the parties’ respective documents differ.62  Consequently, if a buyer’s 
purchase order contains a provision not allowing for arbitration and the seller’s 
acknowledgment contains boilerplate language allowing for arbitration, a 
contract would be formed notwithstanding the presence of conflicting (i.e., 
different) boilerplate terms.63 
Section 2-207 does not, however, abrogate the parties’ ability to create a 
counteroffer.64  Under section 2-207, nonmatching dickered terms alone are not 
enough to prevent a “definite and seasonable expression of acceptance” unless 
at least one of the parties’ dickered terms diverges significantly65 and, therefore, 
                                                 
 57. Brown, supra note 53, at 895–96 (arguing that section 2-207 removes common law 
barriers to assessing parties’ objective manifestations of assent); Colin P. Marks, The Limits of 
Limiting Liability in the Battle of the Forms: UCC Section 2-207 and the “Material Alteration” 
Inquiry, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 501, 510 (2006) (arguing that the primary purpose of section 2-207(1) is 
to prevent minor discrepancies in an offer and acceptance from giving rise to a counteroffer that 
could provide a basis for a party to renege on a contract). 
 58. Keating, supra note 1, at 2684 (stating that section 2-207(1) effectively finished the 
common law mirror image rule); Stephens, supra note 2, at 242. 
 59. Brown Mach., Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 416, 420 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). 
 60. Id. at 420–21; Hitchiner Mfg. Co. v. Modern Indus., Inc., No. 09-cv-242-PB, 2009 WL 
3643471, at *3–4 (D.N.H. Oct. 29, 2009). 
 61. See Brown, 770 S.W.2d at 420–21. 
 62. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); see also RBC Aircraft 
Prods., Inc. v. Precise Machining & Mfg., LLC, 26 F. Supp. 3d 156, 176 (D. Conn. 2014) aff’d in 
part, vacated in part, No. 14-2911, 2015 WL 6875006 (2d Cir. Nov. 10, 2015); Brown, 770 S.W.2d 
at 420. 
 63. See Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Indus., 29 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1994); ConocoPhillips 
Alaska, Inc. v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc., 322 P.3d 114, 128 (Alaska 2014). 
 64. See U.C.C. § 2-207 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 65. Id. 
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will not result in contract formation.66  Thus, if a buyer and seller’s standardized 
forms contain conflicting price terms, the seller’s response to the buyer’s offer 
is a counteroffer because there is no seasonable expression of assent.67  In other 
words, generally courts have found that no contract is formed pursuant to the 
exchange of forms if the dickered terms of the offer and purported acceptance 
do not match in ways that matter to the parties.68 
Subsection 2-207(1) provides the parties another means by which to create a 
counteroffer and negate contract formation pursuant to an exchange of forms.69  
The subsection states that notwithstanding additional or different terms in the 
offeree’s document, a contract will be formed “unless acceptance is expressly 
made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.”70  In order for 
language to give rise to a conditional acceptance, it must clearly indicate the 
offeree’s unwillingness to proceed with the deal unless the offeror assents to the 
additional or different terms in the offeree’s form.71  Generally, courts find that 
language in the offeree’s form that mirrors the language of the conditional 
acceptance provision of section 2-207(1) operates as a counteroffer rather than 
an acceptance.72  To avoid formalistic determinations that would be inconsistent 
with the U.C.C.’s goal of construing its provisions liberally,73 however, 
language can operate as a conditional acceptance even if it does not perfectly 
track the conditional acceptance provision, so long as it places the offeror on 
unambiguous notice that the offeree’s acceptance documents and terms therein 
create a counteroffer rather than an acceptance.74 
To reiterate, conditional acceptance language creates a counteroffer.75  
Assume a buyer emails a purchase order to a seller.  The seller responds by 
emailing its acknowledgement to the buyer.  The seller’s document states that 
                                                 
 66. U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Semco Mfg., Inc., 562 F.2d 1061, 1067 (8th Cir. 1977); Howard 
Constr., Co. v. Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc., 669 S.W.2d 221, 229 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). 
 67. Gage Prods. Co. v. Henkel Corp., 393 F.3d 629, 637–38 (6th Cir. 2004); Laforce, Inc. v. 
Pioneer Gen. Contractors, Inc., No. 299848, 2011 WL 4467762, at *5–6 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 
2011); U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 68. Gen. Elec. Co. v. G. Siempelkamp GmbH & Co., 29 F.3d 1095, 1099 (6th Cir. 1994); 
Laforce, 2011 WL 4467762, at *5; Keating, supra note 1, at 2685 (noting that a divergence in the 
dickered terms of the offer and purported acceptance creates a counteroffer rather than an 
acceptance); Raphelson & Quasarano, supra note 30, at 30. 
 69. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 70. Id. (emphasis added). 
 71. See, e.g., Walter Toebe Constr. Co. v. Kard Welding, Inc., No. 05-73605, 2008 WL 
220620, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 25, 2008). 
 72. See, e.g., PCS Nitrogen Fertilizer, L.P. v. Christy Refractories, L.L.C., 225 F.3d 974, 979 
(8th Cir. 2000); Scientific Components Corp. v. ISIS Surface Mounting, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 653, 
657–58 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 73. White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. McGill Mfg. Co., 165 F.3d 1185, 1191 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 74. Vicor Corp. v. Concurrent Computer Corp., No. 051437A, 2006 WL 1047522, at *4 
(Mass. Supp. Mar. 6, 2006) (quoting JOM, Inc. v. Adell Plastics, Inc., 193 F.3d 47, 53 (1st Cir. 
1999)). 
 75. Walter Toebe, 2008 WL 220620, at *2. 
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the seller’s acceptance of the terms of the buyer’s purchase order are expressly 
conditioned on the buyer’s assent to the terms and conditions contained in the 
seller’s acknowledgment.  The seller’s sending of an acknowledgment 
containing such language constitutes a counteroffer.76  A contract arises pursuant 
to the parties’ exchange of forms only if the buyer expressly assents to the terms 
set forth in the seller’s acknowledgment (counteroffer).77  Therefore, the buyer’s 
mere payment for the goods would not constitute assent by the buyer to the terms 
and conditions contained in the seller’s acknowledgment.  The seller’s shipment 
and the buyer’s acceptance of and payment for the goods will, however, give 
rise to a contract pursuant to conduct which is governed by section 2-207(3).78  
Thus section 2-207(3) is invoked when the parties’ documents fail to give rise 
to a contract usually because a conditional acceptance is not expressly agreed to 
by the initial offeror, but the parties nevertheless engage in conduct evidencing 
a contract.79  In such an instance, the terms of the resulting contract consist of 
the terms in which the parties’ forms are in agreement and U.C.C. Article 2 gap 
filler terms.80 
C.  Governing Terms Under Section 2-207: Displacing the Last Shot Rule 
As it relates to which party’s terms should govern, section 2-207 was premised 
on the assumption that parties do not read the standardized pre-printed terms 
contained in the other party’s standardized form.81  Although research has 
                                                 
 76. Brown, supra note 53, at 921 (“The proviso’s role is to ensure that no acceptance will be 
found where there are other facts unambiguously negating the inference that the form has been used 
as an acceptance.  An effective manifestation of the offeree’s intent not to accept negates the form’s 
usual meaning as a ‘definite and seasonable expression of acceptance’ and renders the offeree’s 
response a counter offer”); Keating, supra note 1, at 2685 (noting that the offeree’s use of 
conditional acceptance language demonstrates the offeree’s intent not to be bound unless the offeror 
specifically assents to the additional or different terms in the offeree’s document). 
 77. PCS Nitrogen Fertilizer, L.P. v. Christy Refractories, L.L.C., 225 F.3d 974, 979–80 (8th 
Cir. 2000); Curwood Inc. v. Prodo-Pak Corp., No. 07-C-544, 2008 WL 644884, at *3 (E.D. Wis. 
Mar. 7, 2008). 
 78. Stemcor USA, Inc. v. Trident Steel Corp., 471 F. Supp. 2d 362, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(stating that a contract can be formed under section 2-207(3) pursuant to conduct where the parties’ 
forms fail to consummate a contract); U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2002). 
 79. Scientific Components Corp. v. ISIS Surface Mounting, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 653, 658 
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that a contract can be formed under section 2-207(3) notwithstanding the 
failure of a contract to arise pursuant to an exchange of forms because of conditional acceptance 
language contained in offeree’s form); U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2002). 
 80. Textile Unlimited, Inc. v. ABMH & Co., 240 F.3d 781, 788 (9th Cir. 2001); Premix-
Marbletite Mfg. Corp. v. SKW Chemicals, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2001); 
U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 81. See Stephens, supra note 2, at 236 (explaining that parties are generally ignorant of the 
boilerplate language contained in the other party’s standardized document). 
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questioned this assumption,82 judicial decisions appear to continue to accept its 
accuracy.83 
As discussed above, section 2-207 was intended to alter the “last shot” rule 
under which the terms of the last party to send a document controlled the terms 
of a resulting agreement.84  Under section 2-207, the seller’s sending of its 
acknowledgment form accepts the buyer’s offer, but the buyer’s acceptance of 
the goods does not constitute assent to the additional boilerplate terms contained 
in the seller’s acknowledgment.85  Of course, a party’s express assent to an 
additional term, such as the offeror signing the offeree’s form, would bind the 
offeror to the additional terms because the additional term is an offer to modify 
the already formed contract, and the offeror is assenting to the offer to modify.86 
1.  The Offeror’s Power to Object Under Sections 2-207(2)(a) and (c) 
Section 2-207(2) allows an offeror to take affirmative steps to exclude 
additional boilerplate terms included in the offeree’s acceptance or confirmation.  
Subsection (2) provides: 
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to 
the contract.  Between merchants such terms become part of the 
contract unless: 
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the 
offer; 
(b) they materially alter it; or 
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given 
or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is 
received.87 
Thus, subsections 2-207(2)(a) and (c) grant the offeror the limited power to set 
the terms of the agreement.88  Under 2-207(2)(a), an offeror can make an 
advance objection to any additional terms contained in the offeree’s acceptance 
or confirmation.89  Subsection 2-207(2)(c) authorizes an offeror to object to 
                                                 
 82. See Keating, supra note 1, at 2703–04. 
 83. See id. at 2682–83. 
 84. See id. at 2684. 
 85. PCS Nitrogen Fertilizer, L.P. v. Christy Refractories, L.L.C., 225 F.3d 974, 980 (8th Cir. 
2000); Stephen W. Ranere, Charting A Course: How Courts Should Interpret Course of Dealing in 
a Battle-of-Forms Dispute, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 671, 681 (2008). 
 86. C9 Ventures v. SVC-W., L.P., 202 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1500 (Cal. App. Ct. 2012); Ranere, 
supra note 85, at 681. 
 87. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 88. Marks, supra note 57, at 511 (stating that sections 2-207(2)(a) and (b) reserves to the 
offeror the power to set terms by objecting to additional terms “before or after the fact”). 
 89. Chainworks, Inc. v. Webco Indus., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-135, 2006 WL 461251, at *7 (W.D. 
Mich. Feb. 24, 2006); Stemcor USA, Inc. v. Trident Steel Corp., 471 F. Supp. 2d 362, 369 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); Marks, 
supra note 57, at 511. 
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additional terms after receiving the document containing an additional term.90  
The offeror’s objection to additional terms within a reasonable time after having 
received the offeree’s acceptance or other document prevents additional terms 
from becoming a part of the parties’ agreement.91  The same rule would apply 
where additional boilerplate terms are contained in a confirmation rather than an 
acceptance.92 
2.  Section 2-207(2)(b): Material Alterations of the Agreement 
Section 2-207(2) gives the offeree limited latitude to add to the terms set forth 
in the offeror’s document.  As discussed above, this power is circumscribed 
where the offeror objects to the additional terms either before or after receiving 
the offeree’s acceptance.93  Subsection 2-207(2)(b) protects the offeror who fails 
to object as provided in sections 2-207(2)(a) & (c) by preventing the offeror from 
being “burdened with any substantial or material additions to the risk 
contemplated by the offer.”94  As articulated in comment four to section 2-207, 
the primary function of subsection (2)(b) is the “avoidance of oppression and 
unfair surprise.”95  If an additional term is one that materially alters the parties’ 
contract, it will be excluded as a term of the parties’ agreement.96  To summarize, 
the offeree’s power to set terms is circumscribed where an additional term in an 
offeree’s acceptance document materially changes the bargain as proposed in 
the offer.97 
The text of section 2-207(2)(b) fails to define when an additional term 
constitutes a material alteration.98  Nonbinding guidance is found, however, in 
comment four of section 2-207. 99 Comment four defines material alteration as 
when the clause would “result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without 
express awareness by the other party. . . .”100  Comment five speaks of 
                                                 
 90. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 91. Gen. Steel Corp. v. Collins, 196 S.W.3d 18, 22 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006); U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(c) 
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); Marks, supra note 57, at 511. 
 92. John E. Murray, The Definitive “Battle of the Forms”: Chaos Revisited, 20 J.L. & COM. 
1, 22 (2000). 
 93. See supra text accompanying notes 87–92. 
 94. Murray, supra note 92, at 8–9. 
 95. Id. at 9; U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 96. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 97. Brown, supra note 53, at 928. 
 98. See U.C.C. § 2-207 (2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 99. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 100. Id.  Comment four reads in its entirety as follows: 
Examples of typical clauses which would normally “materially alter” the contract and so 
result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express awareness by the other party 
are: a clause negating such standard warranties as that of merchantability or fitness for a 
particular purpose in circumstances in which either warranty normally attaches; a clause 
requiring a guaranty of 90% or 100% deliveries in a case such as a contract by cannery, 
where the usage of the trade allows greater quantity leeway; a clause reserving to the seller 
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“unreasonable surprise.”101  Comment four provides examples of additional 
terms that “would normally ‘materially alter’ the contract,” including 
disclaimers of U.C.C. Article 2’s implied warranties of merchantability and 
fitness for particular purpose.102  Comment five identifies additional terms that 
“involve no element of unreasonable surprise,” including clauses providing for 
the payment of interest on overdue accounts and reasonable limits on remedies 
in the event of breach.103 
A critical question that emerges from the materiality standard and the 
illustrations in comments four and five is the extent to which courts have adopted 
the standards in the comments.104  As one commentator noted: 
The difficulty of using examples to define material alteration is its 
tendency to lead to per se rules.  Ignored by section 2-207 is the fact 
that what is or is not a material alteration is dependent upon a number 
of factors and variables, including the value of the transaction, the 
quantity involved in the transaction, the relationship of the parties to 
each other, the custom and usage of trade, and the course of dealing 
and course of performance between the parties.  Only by considering 
all of the above factors can a court make a determination whether a 
term is truly a material alteration.105 
This Article will now focus on how courts have interpreted and applied section 
2-207(2)(b)’s material alteration standard and the variables that influence their 
decision-making. 
                                                 
the power to cancel upon the buyer’s failure to meet any invoice when due; a clause requiring 
that complaints be made in a time materially shorter than customary or reasonable. 
Id. 
 101. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 5 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 102. Id. at cmt. 4. 
 103. Id. at cmt. 5.  Comment five reads in its entirety as follows: 
Examples of clauses which involve no element of unreasonable surprise and which therefore 
are to be incorporated in the contract unless notice of objection is seasonably given are: a 
clause setting forth and perhaps enlarging slightly upon the seller’s exemption due to 
supervening causes beyond his control, similar to those covered by the provision of this 
Article on merchant’s excuse by failure of presupposed conditions or a clause fixing in 
advance any reasonable formula of proration under such circumstances; a clause fixing a 
reasonable time for complaints within customary limits, or in the case of a purchase for sub-
sale, providing for inspection by the sub-purchaser; a clause providing for interest on 
overdue invoices or fixing the seller’s standard credit terms where they are within the range 
of trade practice and do not limit any credit bargained for; a clause limiting the right of 
rejection for defects which fall within the customary trade tolerances for acceptance “with 
adjustment” or otherwise limiting remedy in a reasonable manner. . . . 
Id. 
 104. See Stephens, supra note 2, at 248.  Unless the U.C.C. comments are enacted by a state 
legislature, they are mere commentary and secondary authority.  See generally Baird & Weisberg, 
supra note 4, at 1227–28.  Thus, the only way a comment attains primary authority is when a court 
uses the comment.  See generally Ranere, supra note 85, at 680. 
 105. Stephens, supra note 2, at 248. 
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II.  MATERIAL ALTERATION: OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS 
The author reviewed ninety-four judicial opinions released between January 
1, 2005 and July 1, 2015.  Included are decisions from federal district and 
appellate courts, as well as state trial and appellate courts.  These cases provide 
insight into how courts decide when it is appropriate to incorporate, as an 
additional term, one or more of the following clauses into the parties’ agreement: 
(1) arbitration; (2) warranty disclaimer; (3) limited remedies, including 
disclaimers of consequential damages; (4) pre-judgment interest; (5) attorney’s 
fees; and, (6) forum selection. 
A.  The Surprise or Hardship Test 
Several generalizations can be gleaned from the cases reviewed.  Courts 
impose the burden of establishing a material alteration on the non-assenting 
party who is objecting to the inclusion of the additional term.106  To satisfy its 
burden, most jurisdictions require the non-assenting party to prove that 
incorporating an additional term into the parties’ agreement will result in 
surprise or hardship to the non-assenting party.  In Dumont Telephone Co. v. 
Power & Telephone Supply, Co.,107 the court stated, “A clause will be held to 
‘materially alter’ a contract when it would ‘result in surprise or hardship if 
incorporated without the express awareness of the other party.’”108  A surprise 
or hardship test was also adopted in Leica Geosys., Inc. v. L.W.S. Leasing, Inc.109 
The court relied on comment four to section 2-207 in stating that additional terms 
materially alter an agreement when they “result in surprise or hardship if 
incorporated without express awareness by the other party.”110 
1.  Unreasonable Surprise 
As a guide for determining the presence of unreasonable surprise, many courts 
articulate a general standard derived from the language of comments four and 
five to section 2-207.  The court in Carr v. Michael Weinig, AG111 expressed this 
standard: “To carry the burden of showing surprise, a party must establish that, 
under the circumstances, it cannot be presumed that a reasonable merchant 
would have consented to the additional term.”112  Courts also characterize 
unreasonable surprise as comprising “both the subjective element of what a party 
                                                 
 106. See, e.g., Bayway Ref. Co. v. Oxygenated Mktg. & Trading A.G., 215 F.3d 219, 221 (2d 
Cir. 2000). 
 107. 962 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (N.D. Iowa). 
 108. Id. at 1078 (assessing whether an arbitration provision constitutes a material alteration of 
the parties’ contract). 
 109. 872 F. Supp. 2d 1191 (D. Colo. 2012). 
 110. Id. at 1200 (assessing whether including limitation of remedies, disclaimer of warranty, 
and choice of law provisions in the parties’ contract would materially alter the agreement). 
 111. 2006 WL 2355867 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2006). 
 112. Id. at *5. 
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actually knew and the objective element of what a party should have known.”113  
Based on this view, courts rule that a non-assenting party’s “profession of 
surprise is insufficient to establish surprise unless the non-assenting party can 
also ‘establish that, under the circumstances, it cannot be presumed that a 
reasonable merchant would have consented to the additional term.’”114  Having 
articulated a general standard, courts then examine the factual circumstances 
surrounding the disputed transaction, particularly course of dealing and trade 
usage (the relevance of which are discussed below), to determine if the inclusion 
of the additional term into the contract will amount to unreasonable surprise.115 
Some courts identify a list of factors that would guide their analysis in 
assessing unreasonable surprise.  In ISRA Vision AG v. Burton Industries, Inc.,116 
the court adopted the surprise or hardship test of materiality.117  Discussing 
unfair surprise, the court identified the following factors as salient in 
determining whether a non-assenting party was unreasonably surprised: (1) 
course of dealing; (2) trade usage; (3) the number of form documents exchanged; 
(4) the conspicuousness of the additional term; and (5) whether the party 
objecting to the inclusion of the additional term includes the term in its 
standardized forms.118 
2.  Hardship 
a.  Defining Hardship 
When addressing hardship, courts have generally defined it as substantial 
economic hardship.  In ISRA Vision, the court stated hardship exists where “the 
clause at issue would impose substantial economic hardship on the nonassenting 
party.”119  A clause that “creates or allocates an open-ended or prolonged 
liability” is often provided as an example of substantial economic hardship.120  
Discussing the materiality of an indemnification provision as an additional term, 
a court stated: “A shift in legal liability which has the effect of relieving one 
party of the potential for economic hardship and placing this burden upon 
another party is an important term in any contract.”121 
                                                 
 113. Bayway Ref. Co. v. Oxygenated Mktg. & Trading A.G., 215 F.3d 219, 224 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 114. Glencore, Ltd. v. Degussa Engineered Carbons L.P., 848 F. Supp. 2d 410, 430 (S.D.N.Y 
2012) (quoting Aceros Prefabricados, S.A. v. Tradearbed, Inc., 282 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 2002)). 
 115. See id. at 430. 
 116. 654 F. Supp. 2d 638 (E.D. Mich. 2009). 
 117. Id. at 648. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Carr v. Michael Weinig, AG, No. 5:01-CV-1514(HGM/GJD), 2006 WL 2355867, at *5 
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2006) (quoting Bayway Ref. Co. v. Oxygenated Mktg. & Trading A.G., 215 
F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 2000); accord Oceanconnect.com, Inc. v. Chemoil Corp., No. H-07-1053, 
2008 WL 194360, at *5 (S.D. Tex., Jan. 23, 2008). 
 121. Borden Chem., Inc. v. Jahn Foundry Corp., 834 N.E.2d 1227, 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005). 
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b.  Independent Basis for Establishing Materiality? 
A question arising from the surprise or hardship language of comment four to 
section 2-207 is whether hardship is a basis independent of surprise for 
demonstrating that an additional term constitutes a material alteration.  In 
comment four of section 2-207, the drafters state that a term is a material 
alteration when it results in surprise or hardship, if incorporated without express 
awareness by the other party.122  In comment five, however, the drafters list 
several clauses, which will not be considered material alterations because they 
involve no element of unreasonable surprise.123  Comment five does not address 
hardship.124  This apparent inconsistency between the two comments, coupled 
with the drafters’ decision not to define surprise or hardship, has resulted in 
differing judicial interpretations of the relationship between hardship, surprise, 
and material alteration.  In this regard, Professor Murray stated: 
While “hardship” has often been viewed as substantial economic 
hardship and treated as independent from “surprise,” there is a 
growing recognition that such an analysis may be flawed.  Simply 
because a contract requires performance that may be characterized as 
a hardship, it may still be an operative term of the contract if it is an 
“expected” term, i.e., it is not objectively surprising.  “Hardship is a 
consequence [of material alteration], not a criterion.”125 
Similarly, in Union Carbide Corp. v Oscar Mayer Foods Corp.,126 Judge 
Posner explained that the traditional phrasing of the test—whether the term 
results in surprise or hardship127—is based on a misreading of comment four to 
U.C.C. section 2-207.128  Quoting from the text of comment four, he observed 
that the comment seeks to provide examples of “clauses which would normally 
materially alter the contract and so result in surprise or hardship if incorporated 
without express awareness by the other party.”129  Judge Posner asserted that 
“hardship is a consequence, not a criterion” while surprise may be either.130  This 
perspective finds support in the general principle that a party may not be 
exempted from an agreement to perform contractual duties simply because 
performance of those duties has become a hardship.131 
As alluded to above, jurisdictions differ in their approaches to the issue of 
whether hardship provides an independent ground on which a non-assenting 
                                                 
 122. U.C.C. § 2-207, cmt. 4 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 123. Id. at cmt. 5. 
 124. See id. 
 125. Murray, supra note 92, at 9–10. 
 126. 947 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 127. Id. at 1336. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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party can demonstrate materiality.132  In the cases surveyed, many courts simply 
refrained from addressing this issue and, after articulating the surprise or 
hardship test, made the materiality determination by examining surprise alone133 
or in conjunction with hardship.134 
A split exists, however, among the jurisdictions that specifically considered 
the role of hardship in applying the test.  Some courts have adopted the Seventh 
Circuit approach in holding that hardship is merely a consequence of surprise 
and not a separate basis for examining the materiality of an additional term.135  
Other courts have declined the invitation of the Seventh Circuit and some 
commentators; these courts held that hardship is an independent test of 
materiality.  For example in Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Industries, 
Inc.,136 the court found “that enforcement of the damages limitation provision 
would result in both hardship and surprise [to the non-assenting party].”137 
Explaining its decision not to adopt the reasoning of Union Carbide, the court 
stated that while an interpretation of comments four and five excluding hardship 
may seem reasonable, it fails to provide an answer as to why the drafters 
included hardship at all.138  Further, the Eighth Circuit noted that the comments 
do not carry the force of law.139 
In several cases, courts expressed sympathy for the notion that hardship is 
merely a consequence of surprise, but nevertheless determined materiality by 
considering surprise and, alternatively, hardship.140  Finally, a notable number 
of courts addressed only surprise without discussing hardship.141  In such 
                                                 
 132. See infra text accompanying notes 133–41. 
 133. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Biodiesel of Las Vegas, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-02134-JCM-RJI, 2010 
WL 4121850, at *4–5 (D. Nev. Sept. 8, 2010) (articulating a surprise or hardship test, but focusing 
on the surprise element in finding no material alteration). 
 134. See, e.g., Dumont Tel. Co. v. Power & Tel. Supply Co., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1079–80 
(N.D. Iowa 2013). 
 135. See, e.g., Paul Gottlieb & Co. v. Alps South Corp., 985 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
 136. 401 F.3d 901 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 137. Id. at 912. 
 138. Id. at 911 n.6. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See, e.g., Rocheux Int’l of N. J., Inc. v. U.S. Merchants Fin. Grp., Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 
651, 684 (D.N.J. 2010) (acknowledging the sound reasoning of cases questioning whether hardship 
is an independent factor while focusing on whether an interest clause would impose substantial 
economic hardship on the non-assenting party); Oceanconnect.com, Inc. v Chemoil Corp., No. H-
07-1053, 2008 WL 194360, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2008); Carr v. Michael Weinig, AG, No. 5:01-
CV-1514(HGM/GJD), 2006 WL 2355867, at *5 (N.D.N.Y., Aug. 14, 2006) (noting that the Second 
Circuit has expressed doubt as to whether hardship is an independent basis for finding a material 
alteration, but explicitly declined to resolve the issue). 
 141. In cases assessing the materiality of interest and arbitration clauses, courts typically only 
addressed the surprise element of the test and were silent on hardship.  See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. 
Biodiesel of Las Vegas, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-02134-JCM-RJJ, 2010 WL 4121850, at *5 (D. Nev. Sept. 
8, 2010) (articulating the surprise or hardship test, but focusing on the surprise element in finding 
no material alteration). 
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instances, the Seventh Circuit’s admonition against considering hardship as a 
criterion may have been indirectly achieved. 
B.  Factors that Affect the Meaning of “Surprise” or “Hardship” 
1.  Course of Dealing 
a.  The Significance of Course of Dealing 
The presence of a course of dealing and, to a lesser extent, a trade usage, are 
among the more important factual circumstances that influence whether 
inclusion of an additional term materially alters an agreement.142  Commenting 
on the role that trade usage and course of dealing play in determining whether 
an additional term materially alters the agreement, one commentator stated the 
issue is “the offeror’s reasonable intention manifested by the preprinted form in 
the context of the particularities of the transaction and such circumstances as 
course of dealing or trade usage.”143  The cases reviewed proved that the 
commentator was prescient. 
The U.C.C. defines usage of trade as “any practice or method of dealing 
having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify 
an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in 
question.”144  Section 1-303(d) states that trade usage is relevant only when the 
parties are or should be aware of the industry custom in question.145  This is 
consistent with the requirement in Subsection (c) that the usage of trade must 
have “regularity of observance.”146 
Course of dealing is “a sequence of conduct concerning previous transactions 
between the parties to a particular transaction that is fairly to be regarded as 
establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions 
and other conduct.”147 Comment two of U.C.C. section 1-303 further explains 
that course of dealing is restricted to “a sequence of conduct between the parties 
previous to the agreement.”148  Courts have found that in order to establish a 
course of dealing, there must have been more than one prior transaction between 
the parties.149 
The foregoing definitions have understandably prompted more than one 
commentator to persuasively argue that a term implied into an agreement by 
virtue of trade usage and prior course of dealing should not be subjected to a 
                                                 
 142. See discussion accompanying infra notes 143–151. 
 143. Brown, supra note 53, at 934–35. 
 144. U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001). 
 145. U.C.C. § 1-303(d) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001). 
 146. U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001). 
 147. U.C.C. § 1-303(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001). 
 148. U.C.C. § 1-303 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001). 
 149. See Pycsa Panama, S.A. v. Tensar Earth Techs., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1251 (S.D. 
Fla. 2008), aff’d, 329 F. App’x 257 (11th Cir. 2009). 
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section 2-207(2)(b) additional term analysis.150  According to one, “[a] term that 
simply makes explicit what would otherwise be imported into the contract 
through a course of dealing or usage in the trade is not a material alteration; in 
fact, it is no alteration at all.”151  Notwithstanding the merit of this perspective, 
in the cases reviewed, courts did not discuss this issue, but instead considered 
the absence or presence of trade usage and/or a course of dealing in assessing 
whether there was unreasonable surprise or hardship under section 2-207(2)(b). 
b.  What Constitutes a Course of Dealing? 
A party arguing for including an additional term within an agreement will 
often argue that the party’s repeated sending to the non-assenting party forms 
(e.g., a seller’s invoice) in previous transactions establishes a course of dealing 
that will negate unreasonable surprise, and consequently, materiality.  The cases 
reviewed revealed that many courts assume, without discussion, that an offeree’s 
repetitive sending of a form can give rise to a course of dealing that can 
overcome the non-assenting party’s materiality argument.152  These courts adopt 
this approach even in cases where there was no evidence that the recipient had 
read any of the forms containing the additional term.153 
Among the courts that have addressed whether a course of dealing arises from 
a party’s repetitive sending of forms containing the disputed term, there is a 
notable split.  Although some courts found that no course of dealing arose,154 
more courts found that a course of dealing arose from the repetitive sending of 
forms containing the additional terms.155 
                                                 
 150. See, e.g., John E. Murray, The Judicial Vision of Contract—The “Constructed Circle of 
Assent and Printed Terms, 26 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 386, 403 (2014) (stating that terms implied by 
virtue of prior course of dealing and trade usage are not subject to section 2-207(2)). 
 151. Brown, supra note 53, at 935; see also Murray, supra note 150, at 403. 
 152. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Biodiesel of Las Vegas, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-02134-JCM, 2010 
WL 4121850, at *5 (D. Nev. Sept. 8, 2010); Pycsa Panama, S.A., 625 F. Supp. 2d at 1251. 
 153. See Ranere, supra note 85, at 689 (recognizing one approach by a court where the 
recipient reading the form was irrelevant in determining whether a prior course of dealing existed, 
but the number of times the invoice or acknowledgment had been sent was relevant). 
 154. Welsh v. TEX-MACH, Inc., NO. 08-CV-11401-DPW, 2009 WL 2922955, at *10 (D. 
Mass. Aug. 28, 2009) (holding that the repeated sending of an invoice containing an 
indemnification clause did not constitute a course of dealing); C9 Ventures v. SVC-W., L.P., 202 
Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1488 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). 
 155. Hagrpota for Trading & Distrib., Ltd. v. Oakley Fertilizer, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 
9779(CM)(KNF), 2010 WL 2594286, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2010), aff’d, 531 F. App’x 131 
(2d Cir. 2013) (finding that confirmations containing arbitration provisions from at least twenty-
two previous transactions between the parties created a course of dealing sufficient enough to 
overcome unreasonable surprise argument); Bell, Inc. v. IFS Indus., Inc., 742 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 
1053 (D.S.D. 2010) (holding that the repeated sending of a form containing a forum selection clause 
without objection by the buyer established a course of dealing); Cargill, 2010 WL 4121850, at *5 
(describing sales agreements containing an arbitration provision in dozens of previous transactions 
between the parties, which supported the inclusion of the provision in the contract); CFMOTO 
Powersports Inc. v. NNR Global Logistics USA, Inc., No. 09-2202 (JRT/JJK), 2009 WL 4730330, 
at *5 (D. Minn. 2009) (detailing how terms and conditions attached to 224 invoices established 
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Courts that either failed to address the issue or concluded that the repetitive 
sending of forms created a course of dealing arguably resurrected elements of 
the last shot rule that section 2-207 sought to displace.  According to Professor 
Murray, “‘Course of dealing’ requires a previous sequence of conduct between 
the parties.  The passive conduct of sending and receiving the same boilerplate 
should not be said to establish a course of dealing.”156  Another commentator 
has written: 
To recognize a course of dealing as a mere tally of exchanges between 
two contracting parties would undermine the central purpose of 
section 2-207 because it would perpetuate the problem of giving one 
of the parties the “last shot.” . . . Enforcing all terms—regardless of 
materiality—simply because the accepting party received them in a 
series of prior exchanges . . . . This would violate the essential purpose 
of section 2-207 and arguably restore the “last-shot” nature of 
common law contract interpretation that the Code authors sought to 
eliminate.  Accordingly, courts should determine the existence of a 
course of dealing on a term-by-term basis: only when there is evidence 
that the parties have acted by words or actions to acknowledge a 
specific term should a court allow their prior dealings to impact the 
term’s enforcement.157 
Review of judicial decisions addressing course of dealing in the context of 
section 2-207(2)(b) reveals that courts have by and large ignored these 
concerns.158 
2.  Case-by-Case Versus Per Se Approach 
Over the last decade, courts tended to state that determinations of material 
alteration were to be made on a case-by-case basis.159  Adopting this fact-based 
approach, they then examined the factual circumstances, such as the presence of 
a course of dealing, to determine whether surprise was present.160  The review 
of cases revealed, however, that courts departed from a case-by-case approach 
and engaged in something akin to a per se analysis in determining the materiality 
of forum selection161 and pre-judgment interest clauses.162  On the other hand, 
                                                 
course of dealing); Pycsa Panama, S.A., 625 F. Supp. 2d at 1251 (holding that by sending invoices 
on fourteen occasions, which were attached with terms and conditions that included a limited 
remedy provision, the seller defeated the buyer’s surprise argument); R.O.W. Window Co. v. 
Allmetal, Inc., 856 N.E.2d 55, 60 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (holding that the seller’s repeated sending of 
invoices containing a conspicuous disclaimer of warranties established a prior course of dealing). 
 156. Murray, supra note 92, at 10–11. 
 157. Ranere, supra note 85, at 690. 
 158. See id. at 687–88 (noting the conflict among the jurisdictions and the resulting 
uncertainty). 
 159. See infra discussion accompanying notes 239–41. 
 160. See infra discussion accompanying notes 178, 209–19. 
 161. See infra discussion accompanying notes 376–79. 
 162. See infra discussion accompanying notes 324–29. 
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in a departure from the past in which some courts commonly held that a 
disclaimer of warranties,163 indemnification164 and arbitration provisions per se 
materially altered the party’s contracts, courts analyzing these additional terms 
opted for a fact specific approach.165 
3.  The Irrelevance of the Negation of Implied Terms 
The final observation that can be drawn from the cases reviewed relates to 
whether an additional term materially alters the contract.  An additional term 
negating a U.C.C. implied term alone was not a sufficient basis for finding that 
the additional term materially altered the parties’ agreement.  As expressed by 
one commentator, “The issue is whether the deal proposed by the offeror is 
materially altered by the new term, not whether a standard deal envisioned by 
the Code drafters is so altered.”166  The courts appear to have followed that view 
in finding that an additional term negating a gap-filler term (e.g., a disclaimer of 
an implied warranty) is not, by itself, a material alteration.167 
III.  ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC CLAUSES 
The Article will now discuss the judicial treatment of six clauses that often 
appear as additional terms in acceptance and confirmation documents.  These 
include: (1) arbitration; (2) warranty disclaimer; (3) limitation of remedy; (4) 
pre-judgment interest; (5) attorney’s fees, and (6) forum selection.  The 
discussion begins with arbitration clauses. 
                                                 
 163. Brown, supra note 53, at 936 (observing that courts commonly find a warranty disclaimer 
to materially alter the contract without taking into account all of the factual circumstances, 
including trade usage and prior course of dealing); Alex Devience, Jr., The Renewed Search for the 
“Bargain in Fact” Under U.C.C. 2-207: Battle of the Forms, Part II? Comments on the 
Recommendation to Revise Section 2-207, 9 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 349, 371–72 (1997) (suggesting 
that courts at that time invariably found that an additional term disclaiming implied warranties 
materially altered the agreement); Murray, supra note 92, at 11 (observing courts’ tendency to find 
that a warranty disclaimer clause constituted a material alteration). 
 164. Murray, supra note 92, at 11 (observing that courts commonly held that an 
indemnification clause constituted an additional term that materially altered the contract). 
 165. See infra text accompanying notes 178, 209–19. 
 166. Brown, supra note 53, at 937.  Professor Brown added that: 
[O]nly in the presence of evidence tending to show that the offeree’s term is extremely 
unusual in the industry or between the parties should a gap-filler weigh heavily in 
determining whether the term constitutes a material alteration. This is so even if the evidence 
of the term’s observance falls far short of the standard of regularity necessary to show a 
usage or course of dealing. 
Id. at 936. 
 167. Id. 
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A.  Arbitration Provisions: Summary of Findings 
In sixteen reviewed cases, courts addressed whether an arbitration provision 
constituted a material alteration.168  In four cases, courts ruled that section 2-
207(2)(b) was inapplicable either because,  pursuant to sections 2-207(a) or (c), 
the non-assenting party had objected to the arbitration provisions inclusion in 
the agreements,169 or because the arbitration provision was a term of the offer 
and, as such, should be included in the parties’ contract.170  Of the remaining 
twelve cases, only one court concluded that arbitration provisions materially 
altered the agreement.171 
Courts, finding that an arbitration clause did not materially alter, rejected a 
per se standard in favor of a case-by-case approach.172  These courts also adopted 
a surprise or hardship test to gauge materiality.173  Courts overwhelmingly ruled 
or assumed, without discussion, that surprise and hardship are independent tests 
and that the presence of either renders an additional term a material alteration.174 
The presence of either a trade usage establishing that arbitration was a 
common industry practice or a course of dealing based on an arbitration 
provision that appeared in forms previously communicated between the parties 
was particularly instrumental to courts deciding that an arbitration provision did 
not materially alter a contract.  Five cases focused on trade usage175 and five on 
                                                 
 168. See, e.g., Glencore Ltd. V. Degussa Engineered Carbons, L.P., 848 F. Supp. 2d 410, 429 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 169. Stemcor USA, Inc. v. Trident Steel Corp., 471 F. Supp. 2d 362, 369–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); 
see Gen. Steel Corp. v. Collins, 196 S.W.3d 18, 21–22 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006) (detailing how the 
deleted arbitration provision in the contract did not become a part of the agreement). 
 170. Newark Bay Cogeneration P’ship, LP v. ETS Power Grp., No. CIV.A 11-2441 
(ES)(CLW), 2012 WL 4504475, at *11–12 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2012) (holding the materiality analysis 
in section 2-207(2)(b) is inapplicable when the disputed term is contained in the offer rather than 
an acceptance or confirmation); Vicor Corp. v. Concurrent Computer Corp., No. 051437A, 2006 
WL 1047522, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct., Mar. 6, 2006). 
 171. Hitchiner Mfg. Co., v. Modern Indus., Inc., No. 09-cv-242-PB, 2009 WL 3643471, at *4 
(D.N.H. Oct. 29, 2009) (establishing that an arbitration clause included in an order confirmation 
materially alters the contract because the order confirmation is deemed an acceptance). 
 172. See, e.g., Glencore, 848 F. Supp. 2d at 429. 
 173. See, e.g., id. 
 174. See, e.g., Welsh v. TEX-MACH, Inc., No. 08-cv-11401-DPW, 2009 WL 2922955, at *7–
9 (D. Mass. Aug. 28, 2009); Cheboygan Cement Prods., Inc. v. Glawe, Inc., No. 309745, 2014 WL 
2351772, at *10 (Mich. Ct. App. May 29, 2014). 
 175. In the following cases, courts relied on the existence of industry custom of arbitration in 
rejecting a party’s assertion that including an arbitration provision in the agreement would result in 
surprise or hardship and thus materially alter the agreement: Shany Co., Ltd. v. Crain Walnut 
Shelling, Inc., No. S-11-1112 KJM EFB, 2012 WL 1979244, at *7 (E.D. Cal., June 1, 2012); ICC 
Chem. Corp. v. Vitol, Inc., 425 F. App’x. 57, 59–60 (2d Cir. 2011); Glencore, 848 F. Supp. 2d at 
430; Newark Bay, 2012 WL 4504475, at *12 (adopting the approach adhered to in the foregoing 
cases that there is no surprise where arbitration is an established practice in the parties’ industry); 
Colo.-Ark.-Tex. Distrib., L.L.C. v. Am. Eagle Food Prods., Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 428, 434–35 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).  The court in Am. Eagle also relied on a prior course of dealing, specifically 
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a course of dealing, which involved the repetitive sending by the offeree of a 
form containing an arbitration clause.176  Other grounds for finding an arbitration 
provision did not materially alter were the failure of the non-assenting party to 
allege surprise or hardship177 and the express assent to the additional term by the 
party challenging the inclusion of the arbitration clause.178 
1.  Section 2-207(2)(b) Inapplicable 
In Stemcor USA, Inc. v. Trident Steel Corp.,179 the court found that section 2-
207(2)(a) rather than section 2-207(2)(b) governed whether to include an 
additional term in the contract.180  The buyer initiated contract formation by 
sending a purchase order to the seller.181  The seller responded with an 
acknowledgment form and a sales invoice.182  Each of the seller’s forms included 
an arbitration clause to govern disputes.183  The court ruled that the parties’ 
exchange of forms gave rise to a contract under section 2-207(1), given the 
absence of unambiguous conditional acceptance language in the seller’s 
forms.184  The court then addressed whether the arbitration provision in the 
seller’s acceptance forms was a part of the contract.185  The court found that even 
assuming that the arbitration provision was not material, the clause nevertheless 
must be excluded from the contract because the buyer’s purchase order expressly 
provided that no terms outside of the purchase order would bind the buyer.186  
                                                 
arbitration clauses appearing in documents in previous transactions between the parties to negate 
the non-assenting party’s surprise or hardship argument.  Id. 
 176. Dumont Tel. Co. v. Power & Tel. Supply Co., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1079 (N.D. Iowa 
2013); Hagrpota for Trading & Distrib., Ltd. v. Oakley Fertilizer Inc., No. 09 Civ. 
9770(CM)(KNF), 2010 WL 2594286, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y., June. 18, 2010), aff’d, 531 F. App’x 131 
(2d Cir. 2013); Cargill, Inc. v. Biodiesel of Las Vegas, Inc., No. 2:09–cv–02134–JCM–RJJ, 
2010 WL 4121850, at *5 (D. Nev. Sept. 8, 2010) (establishing that because arbitration provisions 
were included in sales agreements used in dozens of previous transactions between the parties, its 
inclusion in the contract was supported); Oceanconnect.com, Inc. v. Chemoil Corp., No. H-07-
1053, 2008 WL 194360, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2008); Am. Eagle, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 434–35 
(employing the usage of arbitration in the nut industry to negate the non-assenting party’s surprise 
or hardship argument). 
 177. Astra Oil Co., LLC v. Hydro Syntec Chem., Inc., No. 1:13-cv-08395(ALC), 2014 WL 
630676, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2014); Beck Aluminum Int’l, LLC v. Aluar Aluminio Argentino, 
S.A.I.C., No. 1:09 CV 2978, 2010 WL 3260017, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 18, 2010). 
 178. Newark Bay, 2012 WL 4504475, at *11–13. 
 179. 471 F. Supp. 2d 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 180. Id. At 369–70. 
 181. Id. At 364. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. At 367. 
 185. Id. At 369–70. 
 186. Id. 
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This language satisfied section 2-207(2)(a) and therefore excluded the seller’s 
additional terms from the contract.187 
Section 2-207(2)(b) was inapplicable in Vicor Corp. v. Concurrent Computer 
Corp.188 because the arbitration provision appeared in the buyer’s purchase 
order, which constituted an offer (the buyer, who also sold products, sent the 
seller the form that the buyer typically used when it was in the position of a 
seller).189  The seller’s acknowledgement form was silent as to arbitration, so it 
accepted the buyer’s offer, including the arbitration provision.190  Other courts 
have made the same holding.191 
2.  Arbitration Clause Does not Materially Alter 
The presence of trade usage and prior course of dealing figured prominently 
in the nine decisions in which courts concluded that an arbitration provision did 
not materially alter the parties’ contract.192  Glencore Ltd. v. Degussa 
Engineered Carbon, L.P.,193 in which a federal district court applied New York 
law, is illustrative of these cases.  In Glencore, the buyer sued the seller arguing 
that oil the seller had delivered failed to conform to the contract specifications.194  
The seller demanded that the dispute be submitted to arbitration pursuant to an 
arbitration clause contained in the general terms and conditions that had been 
incorporated, by reference, into a sales contract the seller had emailed to the 
buyer.195  The court found that the buyer had assented to the terms of the sales 
contract, including the arbitration provision.196  Alternatively, the court 
concluded that absent express assent, the arbitration clause should be included 
into the parties’ contract because it was an additional term that did not materially 
alter the contract.197  In so concluding, the court relied on Aceros Prefabricados, 
S.A.  v. Tradearbed, Inc.,198 a Second Circuit case applying New York law, and 
held that a mandatory arbitration provision is neither per se material nor 
immaterial and any such determination must be made on a case-by-case basis.199  
                                                 
 187. Id. 
 188. No. 051437A, 2006 WL 1047522 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2006), aff’d, 861 N.E.2d 810 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2007). 
 189. Id. At *4–5. 
 190. Id. At *5. 
 191. See, e.g., Newark Bay Cogeneration P’ship, LP v. ETS Power Group, No. 11-
2441(ES)(CLW), 2012 WL 4504475, at *11 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2012) (arbitration provision was in 
the offer). 
 192. See, e.g., Glencore Ltd. v. Degussa Engineered Carbons, L.P., 848 F. Supp. 2d 410, 429–
31 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 193. 848 F. Supp. 2d 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 194. Id. At 413. 
 195. Id. At 414–15. 
 196. Id. At 429. 
 197. Id. At 429–30. 
 198. 282 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 199. Glencore, 848 F. Supp. 2d at 429. 
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Thus, the court rejected conclusively finding arbitration provisions to materially 
alter unless a party expressly and separately assented to the provision, which had 
been characterized as the “New York Rule.”200  Quoting Aceros, the court stated 
that a material alteration is “one that would result in surprise or hardship if 
incorporated without express awareness by the other party.”201  It further held 
that surprise includes: 
[B]oth a subjective element of what a party actually knew and an 
objective element of what a party should have known; thus, a 
profession of surprise is insufficient to establish surprise unless the 
non-assenting party can also establish that, under the circumstances it 
cannot be presumed that a reasonable merchant would have consented 
to the additional term.202 
The court buttressed its conclusion that the buyer had failed to establish the 
surprise by finding a trade usage in the petroleum industry where arbitration 
provisions are often invoked.203 
The Glencore court’s approach was generally adopted in four cases applying 
California, New York, and Texas law, in which a trade usage favoring arbitration 
was either determinative or an important factor in the courts’ decisions that an 
arbitration provision did not materially alter the contract.204  In these cases, 
courts concluded that absent subjective/actual knowledge by the non-assenting 
party of the presence of an arbitration provision in the other party’s form, the 
presence of trade usage satisfied the objective component of surprise, so as to 
prevent a finding of a material alteration.205  Applying Texas law, a federal court 
noted that “[t]he U.C.C. does not require that a party to a contract have actual 
knowledge of a usage of trade before that usage of trade is incorporated into the 
contract.”206 
Four courts used a prior course of dealing to reject a non-assenting party’s 
claim that an arbitration provision materially altered the parties’ contract.207  In 
                                                 
 200. Id. At 430 n.17. 
 201. Id. At 429 (quoting Aceros Prefabricados, S.A. v. Tradearbed, Inc., 282 F.3d 92, 100 (2d 
Cir. 2002). 
 202. Id. At 429–30 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 203. Id. At 431. 
 204. Shaney Co., Ltd. v. Crain Walnut Shelling, Inc., No. S-11-1112(KJM)(EFB), 2012 WL 
1979244, at *7 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2012); ICC Chem. Corp. v. Vitol, Inc., 425 F. App’x 57, 59–60 
(2d Cir. 2011); Oceanconnect.com, Inc. v. Chemoil Corp., No. H-07-1053, 2008 WL 194360, at *4 
(S.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2008); Colo.-Ark.-Tex. Distrib., L.L.C. v. Am. Eagle Food Prods., Inc., 525 F. 
Supp. 2d 428, 434-35 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (relying in part on the presence of trade usage of arbitration 
in the nut industry to negate the non-assenting party’s surprise or hardship argument). 
 205. See ICC Chem., 425 F. App’x at 59-60; Shaney, 2012 WL 1979244, at *6–7; 
Oceanconnect, 2008 WL 194360, at *4; Am. Eagle, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 434–35. 
 206. Oceanconnect, 2008 WL 194360, at *4. 
 207. Dumont Tel. Co. v. Power & Tel. Supply Co., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1079–80 (N.D. Iowa 
2013); Hagrpota for Trading & Distrib., Ltd. v. Oakley Fertilizer Inc., No. 9779(CM)(KNF), 2010 
WL 2594286, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2010), aff’d, 431 F. App’x 131, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 
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these decisions, the courts allowed a course of dealing to be created by the 
repeated presence of an arbitration clause in the offeree’s acceptance of a seller’s 
confirmation.208  In Dumont Telephone Co. v. Power & Telephone Supply Co.,209 
a buyer argued that an arbitration clause in a seller’s invoices should not be a 
term of the contract because they had failed to read the back of the invoices on 
which the clause appeared.210  The court rejected the buyer’s argument because 
the seller had sent 510 invoices in previous transactions, thereby establishing a 
course of dealing.211  The court expressed doubt that the buyer would not have 
been subjectively aware of the arbitration provision given the number of times 
it appeared in the seller’s invoices.212  Assuming a lack of actual knowledge, the 
court further stated that given the prior course of between the parties, “it is not 
objectively reasonable for Dumont, a merchant corporation, to be unaware of a 
contract provision it has received 510 times before in its prior dealings with 
Power & Tel.”213 
In OceanConnect.Com, Inc. v. Chemoil Corp.,214 the arbitration provisions in 
seven previous sales contracts between the parties were sufficient to rebut the 
non-assenting party’s claim of surprise.215  Similarly, in Hagrpota for Trading 
& Distribution, Ltd. v. Oakley Fertilizer Inc.,216 arbitration clauses in documents 
incorporated by reference into confirmations on at least twenty-one previous 
transactions between the parties was sufficient to establish a course of dealing 
of arbitration and to support the court’s decision to include the provision in the 
contract.217 
Courts tended to focus on the surprise strand of the surprise or hardship 
standard in concluding that an arbitration provision did not materially alter and 
therefore should be included in the contract.  Courts referred to hardship in only 
two cases.  In Dumont, the court rejected the buyer’s argument that, if included, 
the arbitration provision’s deprivation of its right to a judicial forum constituted 
a hardship resulting in a material alteration.218  The court explained “the mere 
fact that an arbitration provision deprives a party of a judicial forum cannot 
                                                 
17828 (2d Cir. 2013); Oceanconnect, 2008 WL 194360, at *5; Am. Eagle, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 434–
35 (finding the presence of trade usage). 
 208. See Dumont, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1079–80. 
 209. 962 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (N.D. Iowa 2013). 
 210. Id. at 1078. 
 211. Id. at 1079. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. No. H-07-105, 2008 WL 194360 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2008). 
 215. Id. at *5. 
 216. No. 9779(CM)(KNF), 2010 WL 2594286 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2010). 
 217. Id. at *7–8; see also Colo.-Ark.-Tex. Distrib., L.L.C., 525 F. Supp. 2d at 434–35 (finding 
that the presence of arbitration provisions in the seller’s confirmations in several previous 
transactions created a course of dealing and undermined the buyer’s surprise argument). 
 218. Dumont, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1080. 
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constitute ‘hardship’ for the purpose of materially altering a contract.”219  In 
Oceanconnect.com, the court examined the question of whether hardship 
constitutes a separate basis for establishing a material alteration or if it’s simply 
a consequence of a material alteration.220  Without deciding on this issue, the 
court adopted the approach taken by courts that have relied on hardship to 
determine a material alteration. The court found a hardship arises when a “term 
is one that creates or allocates an open-ended and prolonged liability.”221 
3.  Arbitration Clause Materially Alters 
In two of the cases, the courts held that an arbitration provision materially 
altered the contract.222  In one decision, the court applied a per se approach;223 
in the other, the court applied a case-by-case approach.224  In Hitchiner 
Manufacturing Co. v. Modern Industries, Inc.,225 a seller’s price quote and 
acknowledgment sent in response to a buyer’s purchase order included an 
arbitration clause.226  Because the court found that the price quote was not an 
offer, the court initially rejected the seller’s argument that the presence of the 
arbitration provision in its price quote made it a part of the agreement.227  It then 
turned to section 2-207(2)(b) to determine if the additional term—the arbitration 
provision in the seller’s acknowledgement, which the court deemed an 
acceptance of the buyer’s purchase order/offer—was a part of the agreement.228  
In excluding the arbitration provision from the agreement, the Hitchiner court 
relied on a 1990 case that applied what was then considered the majority rule 
that arbitration provisions materially alter the contract.229  Importantly, the court 
neglected to inquire into whether inclusion of the provision would result in 
surprise or hardship to the buyer.230 
Applying a facts-based approach, the court in Cogent Computer Systems, Inc. 
v. Turbochef Technologies, Inc.,231 ruled that the inclusion of additional terms, 
including an arbitration provision, materially altered the contract between 
parties.  Finding that additional terms would result in surprise or hardship if 
                                                 
 219. Id. 
 220. Oceanconnect, 2008 WL 194360, at *5. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Hitchner Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Modern Indus., Inc., No. 09-cv-242-PB, 2009 WL 3643471, at 
*4 (D.N.H. Oct. 29, 2009); Cogent Comput. Sys., Inc. v. Turbochef Tech., Inc., No. 06-280S, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5302, at *12 (D.R.I. Jan. 24, 2008). 
 223. Cogent, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5302, at *12. 
 224. Hitchiner, 2009 WL 3643471, at *4. 
 225. No. 09-cv-242-PB, 2009 WL 3643471 (D.N.H., Oct. 29, 2009). 
 226. Id. at *1. 
 227. Id. at *3. 
 228. Id. at *4. 
 229. Id. at *4. 
 230. See id. 
 231. No. 06-280S, 2008 WL 219343 (D.R.I. Jan. 24, 2008). 
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incorporated without Cogent’s express consent,232 the court relied, in part, on 
precedent, which held that an arbitration provision is a per se material 
alteration.233  It further explained, however, that there was no evidence to 
suggest that the seller would have had reason to think that it would be subject to 
arbitration.234  This undue surprise warranted excluding the clause from the 
agreement.235  The court distinguished Cogent from those cases where 
arbitration could be established on the basis of a course of dealing.236  It also 
noted that the arbitration provision was not conspicuous.237  Finally, it found that 
because the additional terms required the arbitration to take place in Atlanta, 
Georgia, the seller would suffer an undue hardship.238 
The cases reviewed represent a shift in courts’ treatment of arbitration 
provisions.  Historically, there was considerable uncertainty surrounding 
whether arbitration provisions materially alter the parties’ contract.239  The shift 
may be a consequence of the increased use of arbitration to resolve commercial 
disputes,240 which makes it easier for arbitration to be a trade usage, leading to 
the demise of the New York rule under which arbitration clauses were deemed 
per se material alterations.241  The above cases suggest the shift is a consequence 
of courts’ greater application of a case-by-case approach in determining when 
clauses materially alter agreements. 
B.  Disclaimer-of-Warranty Clause 
The terms and conditions often incorporated into or attached to a seller’s 
acknowledgment, invoice, sales contract, or confirmation will likely provide for 
some kind of express warranty, while disclaiming implied warranties.  If a 
disclaimer of implied warranties complies with section 2-316(2) or (3), it will 
be effective.242  The following is a sample disclaimer that might appear in a 
seller’s documents: 
Disclaimer.  EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY SET FORTH IN THE 
SPECIFIC WARRANTY FOR A PRODUCT, SELLER MAKES NO 
                                                 
 232. Id. at *12. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at *12–13. 
 237. Id. at *13. 
 238. Id. at *12. 
 239. See Stephens, supra note 2, at 246 (noting the uncertainty regarding whether arbitration 
clauses were considered material alterations). 
 240. See MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §6.1 (3D ED. 2015) 
(commenting that the use of arbitration to resolve various types of commercial disputes has 
increased dramatically, expanding from an estimated 6,448 filings in 1981 to 187,596 filings in 
2011). 
 241. See Glencore Ltd. v. Degussa Engineered Carbons L.P., 848 F. Supp. 2d 410, 430 n.17 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 242. U.C.C. § 2-316(2)–(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
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REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR 
IMPLIED, WRITTEN OR ORAL, RELATING TO THE 
PRODUCTS, OR THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS OBLIGATIONS 
UNDER THE TRANSACTION DOCUMENTS, AND SELLER 
HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OR 
MERCHANTABILITY IMPOSED BY LAW (INCLUDING, 
WITHOUT LIMITATION, WARRANTIES OF DESCRIPTION, 
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS . . . TO THE EXTENT 
PERMISSIBLE.243 
Seven cases were decided over the past decade in which courts addressed 
whether a disclaimer-of-warranty clause, appearing in a seller’s document as an 
additional term, constituted a material alteration.244  In four of these cases, the 
courts ruled that the disclaimer was not a material alteration and, therefore, 
became a term of the contract.245  The opposite result was reached in the three 
other cases.246 
Courts finding that a warranty disclaimer clause was not a material alteration 
tended to adopt a case-by-case approach and the surprise or hardship test for 
determining whether a warranty disclaimer clause amounted to a material 
alteration.247  In contrast, courts finding that a warranty disclaimer materially 
altered the contract did not engage in analysis that was as fact intensive.248  As 
noted previously249 and as was true of arbitration clauses, the case results 
represent a departure from previous decades when courts, relying on the 
language of comment four, gravitated toward finding that disclaimer of warranty 
clauses constituted material alterations.250  Over the last decade, courts astutely 
avoided placing too much reliance on comment four’s examples of terms that 
                                                 
 243. Leica Geosystems, Inc. v. L.W.S. Leasing, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1200 n.8 (D. Colo. 
2012).  A limited remedy provision and a disclaimer of consequential damages, both of which are 
discussed infra, will often appear in tandem with a seller’s warranty disclaimer. 
 244. See infra notes 245–46. 
 245. BVS, Inc. v. CDW Direct, LLC, 936 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1027 (N.D. Iowa 2013), rev’d, 
759 F.3d 869 (8th Cir. 2014); NIC Holding Corp. v. Lukoil Pan Americas LLC, No. 05 CIV 9372, 
2008 WL 4212462, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2008); Monarch Nutritional Labs., Inc. v. Maximum 
Human Performance, Inc., No. 2:03CV474TC, 2005 WL 1683734, at *10 (D. Utah Jul. 18, 2005); 
R.O.W. Window Co. v. Allmetal, Inc., 856 N.E.2d 55, 61 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). 
 246. Leica, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 1200; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Roadtec, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 
06747(PGG), 2010 WL 4967979, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2010); Distinctive Cabinetry, Inc. v. 
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 08-10233, 2009 WL 1448954, at *8 (E.D. Mich. May 22, 2009). 
 247. See infra notes 252–63. 
 248. See infra notes 264–73. 
 249. See supra text accompanying notes 87–92. 
 250. Brown, supra note 53, at 936 (stating that warranty disclaimer clauses were commonly 
found to be material alterations); Murray, supra note 92, at 11 (stating that in 2000, courts at the 
time conclusively presumed that warranty disclaimers constituted materially alterations); see 
Ranere, supra note 85, at 680 (identifying warranty disclaimer as illustrating the type of clauses in 
which courts tended to find were per se material alterations). 
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materially alter and instead engaged in the fact-based analysis contemplated by 
the surprise or hardship test of materiality.251 
1.  Warranty Disclaimer Clause Does Not Materially Alter 
In two cases, the existence of course of dealings between the parties was the 
basis for the courts’ decisions that a warranty disclaimer was not a material 
alteration.252  In both instances, the course of dealing arose from the seller’s 
repeated sending of its terms and conditions without objection by the buyer.253  
In Monarch Nutritional Laboratories, Inc. v. Maximum Human Performance, 
Inc.,254 in twelve previous transactions, the buyer had received the seller’s terms 
and conditions that contained conspicuous warranty disclaimers in the packing 
paper or invoices.255  Applying a surprise or hardship test for determining 
materiality, the court found that the buyer’s failure to object and to otherwise 
offer proof of surprise or hardship resulted in its failure to carry its burden of 
establishing that a limitation of damages and disclaimer provision were material 
alterations.256  In R.O.W. Window Co. v. Allmetal, Inc.,257 the court ruled the 
buyer’s material alteration argument was negated by a course of dealing arising 
from the seller’s invoices conspicuously disclaiming warranties, which were 
sent over a sixteen-year period.258  A course of dealing was also instrumental in 
the Eighth Circuit’s remand of a lower court decision that a disclaimer in the 
seller’s terms and conditions was part of a course of dealing that supplemented 
the parties’ contract.259  The district court found that the seller established a 
course of dealing to defeat the buyer’s materiality argument by proving that 
more than 250 of the seller’s confirmation invoices and other documents from 
previous transactions included a warranty disclaimer.260 In BVS, Inc. v. CDW 
Direct, LLC,261 the Eighth Circuit accepted the notion that a party can overcome 
a non-assenting party’s materiality argument by establishing a course of dealing 
and remanded the case because the uniqueness of the contract formation process 
                                                 
 251. See, e.g., Pycsa Panama, S.A. v. Tensar Earth Techs., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (S.D. 
Fla. 2008), aff’d, 329 F. App’x. 257 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Monarch Nutritional Labs., Inc. v. 
Maximum Human Perforance, Inc., No. 2:03CV474TC, 2005 WL 1683734 at *7–9 (D. Utah July. 
18, 2005). 
 252. Monarch Nutritional Labs., 2005 WL 1683734, at *8–10; R.O.W. Window Co. v. 
Allmetal, Inc., 856 N.E.2d 55, 60–61 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). 
 253. Monarch Nutritional Labs., 2005 WL 1683734, at *8–10; R.O.W. Window, 856 N.E.2d at 
60–61. 
 254. No. 2:03CV474TC, 2005 WL 1683734 (D. Utah July 18, 2005). 
 255. Id. at *2–3. 
 256. Id. at *9–10. 
 257. 856 N.E.2d 55 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). 
 258. Id. at 60–61. 
 259. BVS, Inc. v. CDW Direct, LLC, 759 F.3d 869, 873 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 260. BVS, Inc. v. CDW Direct, LLC, 936 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1019, 1026–27 (N.D. Iowa 2013), 
rev’d, 759 F.3d 869 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 261. 759 F.3d 869 (8th Cir. 2014). 
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in the transaction at issue required further findings of fact as to the existence of 
a course of dealing.262  Another court ruled, without explanation, that “[t]he 
warranty provision at issue constituted neither a ‘surprise’ nor a ‘hardship’ 
within the meaning of section 207(2)(b),” and therefore did not materially alter 
the contract.263 
2.  Warranty Disclaimer Clause Materially Alters 
The two courts finding that a disclaimer of warranty provision materially 
altered the contract took similar approaches.  In Leica Geosystems, Inc. v. L.W.S. 
Leasing, Inc.,264 following negotiations and the seller’s sending of price quotes, 
the buyer sent a seller a purchase order for helicopter equipment.265  In response, 
the seller delivered the equipment and sent an invoice acknowledging delivery 
of the equipment.266  Appearing on the invoice was a link to the seller’s websites 
concerning its warranty terms, including a disclaimer of warranties.267  Because 
the court concluded that a contract was consummated upon the delivery of the 
equipment under section 2-204(1) (of Colorado’s corresponding statute),268 it 
found that the invoice constituted a confirmation of the parties’ contract and that 
the disclaimer was an additional term subject to section 2-207(2)(b).269  The 
court relied on precedent stating that disclaimers of warranties “shift the 
distribution of risk between the parties” and the language in Comment four that 
describing as a material alteration a “clause negating such standard warranties 
as that of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose . . . .”270  Without 
specifically discussing the facts of the case before it, in Distinctive Cabinetry, 
Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,271 the court also relied on precedent and 
comment three272 in finding that the warranty disclaimer was a material 
alteration.273 
                                                 
 262. Id. at 873. 
 263. NIC Holding Corp. v. Lukoil Pan Americas LLC, No. 05 Civ.9372(LAK), 2008 WL 
4212462, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2008). 
 264. 872 F. Supp. 2d 1191 (D. Colo. 2012). 
 265. Id. at 1194, 1196. 
 266. Id. at 1196. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 1198.  Note that the court did not apply section 2-206(1), which covers contract 
formation where a buyer sends a purchase order and the seller ships the goods.  U.C.C. § 2-206(1).  
The court also avoided the thorny issue of the effect to give to a purported confirmation after the 
contract has been formed. See, e.g., Rocheux Int’l of N.J., Inc. v. U.S. Merchants Fin. Grp., Inc., 
741 F. Supp. 2d 651, 677–80 (D.N.J. 2010). 
 269. Leica Geosystems, Inc. v. L.W.S. Leasing, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1199–1200 (D. 
Colo. 2012). 
 270. Id. at 1200. 
 271. No. 08-10233, 2009 WL 1448954 (E.D. Mich. May 22, 2009). 
 272. The court referred to comment three but comment four refers to warranty disclaimers as 
an example of a term that materially alters. 
 273. Distinctive Cabinetry Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 08-10233, 2009 WL 1448954, 
at *8 (E.D. Mich. May 22, 2009); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Roadtec, Inc., No. 06747(PGG), 
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C.  Limited Remedy Clause 
A seller will often include a limited remedy and/or a disclaimer of 
consequential damages in its terms and conditions.  The following is a sample 
limited remedy clause that might appear in a seller’s documents: 
Limitation. Seller’s total liability and buyer’s exclusive remedy for 
any and all losses and damages arising out of any cause whatsoever 
related to this agreement under any theory of contract, tort, strict 
liability or other legal or equitable theory shall be limited to buyer’s 
actual direct damages not to exceed the purchase price of the goods 
that caused the damages, or the repair or replacement of such goods. 
And in no event shall seller be liable for lost profits, special, incidental, 
consequential, or punitive damages.274 
U.C.C. section 2-719 regulates the effectiveness of a limited remedy 
provision.275 
Comment five to section 2-207 specifically identifies a limited remedy 
provision as an example of clauses that do not materially alter.276  According to 
the comment: 
Examples of clauses which involve no element of unreasonable 
surprise and which therefore are to be incorporated in the contact 
unless notice of objection is seasonably given are . . . a clause limiting 
the right of rejection for defects which fall within the customary trade 
tolerances for acceptance “with adjustment” or otherwise limiting 
remedy in a reasonable manner[.]277 
The following discussion reveals that courts have not strictly adhered to the 
Comment’s suggestion. 
In eleven cases decided between January 1, 2005 and July 1, 2015, courts 
addressed whether a limited remedies provision, as an additional term, became 
a term of the parties’ contract.278  In three cases, courts ruled that limited 
remedies clauses were not material alterations and, therefore, became terms of 
the parties’ contracts.279  In four of the cases reviewed, limited remedies 
                                                 
2010 WL 4967979, at *4–6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2010) (finding that a party’s attempt to disclaim 
the implied warranty of merchantability was ineffective because the disclaimer was neither 
conspicuous nor timely). 
 274. ASi Indus. GMBH v. MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc., No. 4:06CV951(CDP), 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 10732, at *13–14 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 13, 2008). 
 275. U.C.C. § 2-719 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 276. See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 5 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 277. Id. 
 278. See infra notes 281–85. 
 279. Pycsa Panama, S.A. v. Tensar Earth Techs., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1250–51 (S.D. 
Fla. 2008); Monarch Nutritional Labs., Inc. v. Maximum Human Performance, Inc., No. 
2:03CV474TC, 2005 WL 1683734, at *9 (D. Utah July 18, 2005); Paul Gottlieb & Co. v. Alps 
South Corp., 985 So.2d 1, 7–8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
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provisions were deemed to constitute material alterations.280  In three other 
cases, courts rejected motions for summary judgment because of the presence of 
issues of fact as to whether a limited remedy or disclaimer of consequential 
damages materially altered the contract.281  Similarly, the Eighth Circuit stated 
that a course of dealing could overcome a buyer’s materiality argument in 
regards to additional terms, including limited remedy and disclaimer clauses, but 
remanded for further factual findings as to the existence of a course of dealing.282  
Finally, section 2-207(2)(b) was inapplicable where a limited remedies clause 
became a term of the contract given that it appeared in the seller’s offer, which 
was accepted by the buyer.283 
1.  Limited Remedy Clause Does Not Materially Alter 
As was true of disclaimer of warranty clauses, course of dealing was 
instrumental in each judicial finding that a limited remedy provision did not 
constitute a material alteration.  In Pycsa Panama, S.A v. Tensar Earth 
Technologies, Inc.,284 and Monarch Nutritional Laboratories, Inc. v. Maximum 
Human Performance, Inc.,285 the surprise or hardship test was adopted for 
determining materiality.286  The sellers’ repetitive sending of invoices containing 
the limited remedy provisions, without objection by the buyer, established a 
course of dealings that negated surprise and resulted in holdings that the clauses 
did not materially alter the parties’ contracts.287 
                                                 
 280. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 401 F.3d 901, 912–13 (8th Cir. 2005); 
Leica Geosystems, Inc. v. L.W.S. Leasing, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1201 (D. Colo. 2012); BVS 
Inc. v. CDW Direct, LLC, 936 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1026–27 (N.D. Iowa 2003); Cheboygan Cement 
Prods., Inc. v. Glawe, Inc., No. 309745, 2014 WL 2351772, at *10–11 (Mich. Ct. App., May 29, 
2014). 
 281. Keywell, L.L.C. v. Perkinelmer, Inc., No. 11-CV-182-HKS, 2013 WL 4520017, at *7 
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2013); Grovenor House, L.L.C. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., No. 09-
21698-Civ., 2010 WL 3385344, at *8–9 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2010); ASi Indus. GMBH v. MEMC 
Elec. Materials, Inc., No. 4:06CV951 CDP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10732, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Feb 13, 
2008). 
 282. BVS, Inc. v. CDW Direct, LLC, 759 F.3d 869, 873 (8th Cir. 2014).  For a more detailed 
discussion of BVS, see supra text accompanying notes 207–08 (warranty disclaimer discussion). 
 283. Kalzip, Inc. v. TL Hill Construction, LLC, No. 8:11-cv-01842-T-27/TBM, 2013 WL 
1909604, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 8, 2013). 
 284. 625 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (S.D. Fla. 2008). 
 285. No. 2:03CV474TC, 2005 WL 1683734 (D. Utah Jul. 18, 2005). 
 286. Pycsa Panama, S.A. v. Tensar Earth Techs., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1250 (S.D. Fla. 
2008); Monarch Nutritional Labs., Inc. v. Maximum Human Performance, Inc., No. 2:03CV474TC, 
2005 WL 1683734, at *9 (D. Utah July 18, 2005). 
 287. Pycsa, 625 F. Supp. 2d, at 1250–51 (holding that the seller’s inclusion of limited remedy 
provision in at least fourteen invoices sent by the seller in previous transactions with the buyer 
established a prior course of dealings); Monarch, 2005 WL 1683734, at *7–8 (holding that a limited 
remedy provision in at least twelve copies of terms and conditions, included in pacing paper or with 
invoices, established a course of dealings). 
2016] When Does an Additional Term Materially Alter a Contract?  523 
Course of dealings was also influential in Paul Gottlieb & Co. v. Alps South 
Corp.,288 where the court adopted the Seventh Circuit’s approach that hardship 
is merely a consequence of surprise.289  Nevertheless, it analyzed whether the 
inclusion of seller’s additional term, a disclaimer of consequential damages, 
would result in surprise or hardship.290  With respect to surprise, the court stated 
that the burden of proof was imposed on the non-assenting party—the buyer—
to prove “that under the circumstances it cannot be presumed that a reasonable 
merchant would have consented to the additional term.”291  In concluding that 
the buyer failed to carry its burden, the court identified facts that included the 
parties’ prior dealings—the contract at issue was the sixth in a series between 
the two parties, and in each of the previous contracts, the seller’s documents 
included the limitation of liability term, which was visible of the face of the 
documents.292  The court also noted that the failure of the buyer to have read the 
seller’s documents would not, under Florida law, excuse the buyer from being 
bound by the terms.293  It also pointed to the language in comment five as support 
for its holding.294 
The Gottlieb court determined that the record was equally devoid of evidence 
of hardship.295  Adopting a test of whether inclusion of the additional term would 
“impose substantial economic hardship on the non-assenting party,”296 the court 
ruled that the buyer could not sustain its burden by arguing that incorporating 
the limitation of liability clause would result in severe economic hardship.297  In 
this regard, the court found that the seller never represented that it would 
reimburse the buyer for consequential damages sustained because of the seller’s 
breach, and the buyer neglected to inform the seller of the potential 
consequences of the breach.298 
2.  Limited Remedy Clause Materially Alters 
Courts in two of the three cases, finding that a limited remedy clause was a 
material alteration, engaged in a case-by-case analysis.  In Marvin Lumber & 
Cedar Co. v. PPG Industries, Inc.,299 the Eighth Circuit adopted the surprise or 
                                                 
 288. 985 So.2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
 289. Id. at 7. 
 290. Id. at 8. 
 291. Id. at 7. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. at 8. 
 296. Id. (quoting Trans−Aire Int’l, Inc. v. N. Adhesive Co., Inc., 882 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 
1989)). 
 297. Id. at 8. 
 298. Id. (quoting Bayway Ref. Co. v. Oxygenated Mktg. & Trading, 215 F.3d 219, 224 (2d 
Cir. 2000)). 
 299. 401 F.3d 901 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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hardship test to determine materiality.300  With respect to surprise, the court 
rejected the seller’s argument that there could be no surprise because the clause 
limiting the buyer’s remedies to the contract price appeared in sixty-six 
acknowledgements the seller sent to the buyer.301  Although the clause appeared 
in the acknowledgments, the court stated the inclusion of the clause into the 
contract would amount to unreasonable surprise because the provision was in 
boilerplate language, small print, and was not bargained for.  Several witnesses 
testified to being subjectively surprised and there was evidence that in the past 
the seller and other manufacturers had not strictly enforced the limited remedy 
provision.302  As to hardship, the court first ruled that it should be considered 
independent of surprise for finding a material alteration.303  The court further 
explained that the limited remedy clause would cause a hardship to the non-
assenting party because the buyer would not be able to recover the full extent of 
the expected remedies otherwise available.304 
In Cheboygan Cement Products, Inc. v. Glawe, Inc.,305 the Michigan court 
applied a surprise or hardship test for materiality.306  The court concluded the 
buyer would suffer a hardship if the contract included the clause limiting the 
buyer’s remedy to the contract price and granting only three days after delivery 
to discover and identify “exceptions and claims” arising from use of a defective 
product.307  A per se approach rather than a case-by-case approach, however, 
was taken in Leica Geosys, Inc.,308 where the court summarily resolved the 
question of the materiality of a clause disclaiming the buyer’s recovery of 
incidental and consequential damages.309  Relying on Colorado precedent, the 
court held that the limitation clause was a material alteration of the contract and 
as such should not be included in the contract.310 
As was true prior to the last decade, courts continue to be split on whether a 
limited remedies provision constitutes a material alteration.311  What has 
changed, however, is the greater application by courts of a case-by-case 
approach in making this determination.312  Consequently, courts are less likely 
to rely solely on the language in comment five suggesting that a limited remedy 
clause does not materially alter, or alternatively, to assume that because a limited 
                                                 
 300. Id. at 911–12. 
 301. Id. at 910, 912. 
 302. Id. at 912–13. 
 303. Id. at 911 n.6. 
 304. Id. at 912. 
 305. No. 309745, 2014 WL 2351772 (Mich. Ct. App., May 29, 2014). 
 306. Id. at 10. 
 307. Id. at 10. 
 308. 872 F. Supp. 2d 1191 (D. Colo. 2012). 
 309. Id. at 1201. 
 310. Id. 
 311. See supra discussion accompanying notes 278–310. 
 312. See id. 
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remedy provision holds the potential to significantly shift liability, it constitutes 
a material alteration per se.313 
D.  Interest and Attorney’s Fees Provisions 
Sellers commonly incorporate into confirmations, acknowledgments, and 
invoices provisions obligating a buyer to pay interest on overdue accounts and 
attorneys’ fees incurred in a seller’s efforts to collect payment from a buyer.  The 
following is a sample pre-judgment interest and attorney’s fee clause that might 
appear in a seller’s documents: 
Past due accounts are subject to interest charge of 1-1/2% per month, 
maximum 18% per annum.  Buyer agrees to pay collection costs, 
including collection agency fees, reasonable attorney’s fees, and court 
costs if this account is placed in collection.314 
This survey identified twenty-five cases decided between January 1, 2005 and 
July 1, 2015 in which courts determined whether interest and/or attorneys’ fees 
provisions materially altered parties’ agreements.315  Courts addressed whether 
                                                 
 313. See Murray, supra note 92, at 12 (“[A] number of courts ignore this language and 
conclude that such a limitation of remedy clause is a per se material alteration because of its 
essential nature in shifting substantial risks to a buyer.”); Ranere, supra note 85, at 680 n.64 
(establishing warranty disclaimer and limited remedy provisions as clauses where courts tend to 
identify them as materially altering as a matter of law). 
 314. AFL Fresh & Frozen Fruits & Vegetables, Inc. v. De-Mar Food Servs. Inc., No. 06 Civ. 
2142(GEL), 2007 WL 4302514, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2007). 
 315. Echo, Inc. v. Timberland Machines. & Irrigations, Inc., 661 F.3d 959, 967 (7th Cir. 2011); 
Coosemans Specialties, Inc. v. Gargiulo, 485 F.3d 701, 708 (2d Cir. 2007); Tomato Mgmt., Corp. 
v. CM Produce LLC, No. 14-CV-3522(JPO), 2014 WL 2893368, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2014); 
Hop Hing Produces Inc. v. X & L Supermarket, Inc., No. 2012-1401(ARR)(MDG), 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 47518, at *11–12 (E.D.N.Y. March 4, 2013); Bearden v. Great Lakes Produce and Mktg. 
LLC, No. 1:12-CV-700, 2013 WL 2318857 at *2 (W.D. Mich. May 28, 2013); Food Team Int’l, 
Ltd. v. Unilink, LLC., 872 F. Supp. 2d 405, 421–22 (E.D. Pa. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
595 F. App’x 146 (3d Cir. 2014); Rocheux Int’l of N.J., Inc. v. U.S Merchants Fin. Grp. Inc., 741 
F. Supp. 2d 651, 676–77 (D.N.J. 2010); Minnesota Elevator, Inc. v. Imperial Elevator Servs., Inc., 
758 F. Supp. 2d 533, 540–41 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Sato & Co. LLC v. S & M Produce, Inc., No. 08-cv-
7352, 2010 WL 431601, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2010); Bounty Fresh, LLC v. Paradise Produce, 
Inc., No. CV 2009-5577(FB)(MDG), 2010 WL 3781997, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2010); EBM-
Papst Inc. v. Aeiomed, Inc., No. 09-551 ADM/JJK, 2010 WL 4720848, at *5–6 (D. Minn. Nov. 15, 
2010); Jada Toys, Inc. v. Chicago Import, Inc., No.07C699, 2009 WL 3055370, at *7 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 18, 2009); Ger-Nis Int’l, LLC v. FJB, Inc., No.07CV898(CM), 2008 WL 2704384, at *11 
(S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008); Palmareal Produce Corp. v. Direct Produce #1, Inc., No. 07-CV-
1364(SLT)(RLM), 2008 WL 905041, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. March 31, 2008); Argi Exotic Trading, 
Inc. v. New Man Designed Sys., Ltd, No. 07-CV-0049 (NG)(MDG), 2008 WL 2397565, at *3 
(E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2008); AFL Fresh, 2007 WL 4302514, at *7–8; Smith & Loveless, Inc. v. 
Caicos Corp., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1151 (D. Kan. 2007); Brigiotta’s Farmland Produce & Garden 
Center, Inc. v. Przykuta, Inc., No. 05-CV-273S, 2006 WL 3240729, at *5–6 (W.D.N.Y. July 13, 
2006); Review Video, LLC. v. Enlighten Techs., Inc., No. C04-0123, 2005 WL 91297, at *2–3 
(N.D. Iowa Jan. 12, 2005); Top Banana, L.L.C. v. Dom’s Wholesale & Retail Center, Inc., No. 
04CV2666(GBD), 2005 WL 1529736, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2005), aff’d, 485 F.3d 701 (2d Cir. 
N.Y); Monarch Nutritional Labs., Inc. v. Maximum Human Performance, Inc., No. 2:03CV474TC, 
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interest clauses materially altered the parties’ contracts in twenty of the twenty-
five cases.316  In none of the twenty cases did a court find that an interest clause 
materially altered the contract.  The materiality of attorney’s fees was considered 
in twenty of the twenty-five cases reviewed.317  In two of these cases, buyers 
successfully convinced courts that attorney’s fee clauses materially altered the 
parties’ agreement.318 
In each of the cases surveyed, the courts adopted the surprise or hardship 
standard for determining if interest or attorney’s fee provisions constitute 
material alterations.  While articulating this, with a limited number of 
exceptions, the tendency was for the court to address only the surprise 
component of the test.319  In regard to surprise, several courts acknowledged that 
it consists of subjective and objective components.320  As was true of arbitration 
provisions, courts imposed the burden of demonstrating surprise or hardship on 
the buyer or non-assenting party.321  Courts engaging in more than a superficial 
                                                 
2005 WL 1683734, at *6 (D. Utah July 18, 2005); Dayoub Mktg., Inc. v. S.K. Produce Corp., 04 
Civ. 3125 (WHP), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26974, at *14–17 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2005); 
ConocoPhillips v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, 322 P.3d 114, 121–22 (Alaska 2014); A.E. 
Robinson Oil Co., Inc. v. County Forest Prods., Inc., 40 A.3d 20, 23 (Me. 2012); Serge Dore’ 
Selections Ltd. v. Universal Wines & Spirits, 20 Misc.3d 1121(A), 11–12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008). 
 316. Tomato, 2014 WL 2893368, at *2–3; ConocoPhillips, 322 P.3d 114 at 141; Hop Hing, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47518, at *10–12; A.E. Robinson, 40 A.3d at 23; Food Team, 872 F. Supp. 
2d at 420; Echo, 661 F.3d at 966–67; Rocheux, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 680–81; Bounty Fresh, 2010 WL 
3781997, at *2–3; Minnesota Elevator, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 540; Jada Toys, 2009 WL 3055370, at 
*7–8; Ger-Nis, 2008 WL 2704384, at *11; Argi, 2008 WL 2397565, at *3; Palmareal, 2008 WL 
905041, at *3; Smith & Loveless, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 1151; AFL Fresh, 2007 WL 4302514; 
Brigiotta’s, 2006 WL 3240729, at *5–6; Review Video, 2005 WL 91297, at *2; Dayoub, 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 26974, at *14–16; Top Banana, 2005 WL 1529736; Monarch, 2005 WL 1683734, at 
*6. 
 317. Coosemans, 485 F.3d at 708; Tomato, 2014 WL 2893368, at *2; Hop Hing, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 47519, at *11–12; Bearden, 2013 WL 2318857, at *2; A.E. Robinson, 40 A.3d at 23; 
Food Team, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 419–20; Rocheux, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 676–77; EBM-Papst, 2010 
WL 4720848, at *5–6; Bounty Fresh, 2010 WL 3781997, at *3–4; Sato, 2010 WL 431601, at *5; 
Jada Toys, 2009 WL 3055370, at *7–8; Ger-Nis, 2008 WL 2704384, at *11–12; Serge Dore’, 20 
Misc.3d 1121(A) at *11–12; Argi, 2008 WL 2397565, at *3; Palmareal, 2008 WL 905041, at *2–
-3; Smith & Loveless, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 1151–52; AFL Fresh, 2007 WL 4302514, at *7–8; 
Brigiotta’s, 2006 WL 3240729, at *5–6; Dayoub, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26974, at 14–17; Top 
Banana, 2005 WL 1529736, at *5. 
 318. Food Team, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 422; A.E. Robinson, 40 A.3d at 23–24. 
 319. See, e.g., EBM-PABST, 2010 WL 4720848, at *6; Bearden, 2013 WL 2318857, at *2–3; 
Top Banana, 2005 WL 1529736, at *5. 
 320. See, e.g., Coosemans, 485 F.3d at 708; AFL Fresh, 2007 WL 4302514, at *8 (stating that 
surprise includes subjective and objective elements); Top Banana, 2005 WL 1529736, at *5 
(finding the buyer failed to present evidence to demonstrate subjective or objective surprise or 
hardship). 
 321. See, e.g., Coosemans, 485 F.3d at 708; Bearden, 2013 WL 2318857, at *3. 
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analysis also accepted the notion that determinations of material alteration 
should be made on a case-by-case basis.322 
1.  Pre-Judgment Interest Clause 
In assessing the materiality of an interest clause as an additional term, courts 
generally adopted the surprise or hardship standard for material alteration.323  
These courts rarely, however, engaged in more than a superficial analysis.  
Rather, they tended to summarily reject buyers’ material alteration argument, 
adopting something akin to a per se rule in finding interest clauses did not 
materially alter.324  In adopting this approach, courts relied on the language in 
comment five to section 2-207, which states that clauses that do not involve 
unreasonable surprise include “a clause providing for interest or overdue 
invoices.”325  These courts also relied on precedent,326 the existence of a course 
                                                 
 322. See, e.g., Bearden, 2013 WL 2318857, at *3 (stating that whether an additional term 
materially alters a contract depends on the facts of each case). 
 323. See, e.g., A.E. Robinson, 40 A.3d at 23–24; Top Banana, 2005 WL 1529736, at *5; Review 
Video, 2005 WL 91297, at *2–3 (relying on comment five and also stating that a clause calling for 
interest on past due accounts even if substantially greater than the default interest rate does not give 
rise to unreasonable surprise).  But see, Rocheux Int’l of N.J., Inc. v. U.S Merchants Fin. Grp., Inc., 
741 F. Supp. 2d 651, 682–85 (D.N.J. 2010) (applying the surprise or hardship test, but 
acknowledging that questions have been raised as to whether hardship is an independent basis for 
establishing a material alteration). 
 324. See A.E. Robinson, 40 A.3d at 23; Top Banana, 2005 WL 1529736, at *5. 
 325. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 5 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); see Echo, Inc. v. 
Timberland Machs. & Irrigations, Inc., 661 F.3d 959, 967 (7th Cir. 2011); Tomato Mgmt., Corp. 
v. CM Produce LLC, No. 14-CV-3522(JPO), 2014 WL 2893368, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2014); 
Food Team Int’l, Ltd. v. Unilink, LLC, 872 F. Supp. 2d 405, 421 (E.D. Pa. 2012); Jada Toys, Inc. 
v. Chicago Imp., Inc., No. 07C699, 2009 WL 3055370, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2009 (finding a 
prior course of dealing whereby the seller included the interest provision into invoices in hundreds 
of previous transactions between the parties); Brigiotta’s Farmland Produce & Garden Center, Inc. 
v. Przykuta, Inc., No. 05-CV-273S, 2006 WL 3240729, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. July 13, 2006); Dayoub 
Mktg, Inc. v. S.K. Produce Corp., No. 04 Civ. 3125(WHP), 2005 WL 3006032, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 9, 2005); Review Video, 2005 WL 91297, at *2–3 (relying on comment five and also stating 
that a clause calling for interest on past due accounts even if substantially greater than the default 
interest rate does not give rise to unreasonable surprise); see also Ger-Nis Int’l, LCC v. FJB, Inc., 
No. 07CV898(CM), 2008 WL 2704384, at *15–16 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008) (adopting the rule 
articulated in Dayoub that interest provisions do not materially alter the contract in regards to 
several defendants, but remanding for consideration of whether one buyer objected to the clause); 
A.E. Robinson, 40 A.3d at 23 (relying on the language in comment five in finding no material 
alteration but also finding a prior course of dealing supported including an interest provision in the 
parties’ contract). 
 326. See, e.g., Hop Hing Produces Inc. v. X & L Supermarket, Inc., No. CV 2012-
1401(ARR)(MDG), 2013 WL 1232919, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. March 4, 2013); Echo, Inc., 661 F.3d at 
967; Minnesota Elevator, Inc. v. Imperial Elevator Servs., Inc., 758 F. Supp. 2d 533, 540–41 (N.D. 
Ill. 2010). 
528 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 65:489 
of dealings,327 and the buyer’s failure to either proffer evidence of or to plead 
surprise or hardship.328 
2.  Attorney’s Fees Clause 
Courts’ approaches varied in the twenty cases reviewed in which the 
materiality of an attorney’s fee clause was disputed.  In several instances, courts 
summarily rejected buyers’ surprise or hardship arguments relating to an 
attorney’s fee clause, although less often than for interest provisions.329  This 
was particularly true when the subject matter of the contract involved 
perishables and thereby implicated the Perishables Agricultural Commodities 
Act (“PACA”), which has been interpreted to allow for the recovery of 
reasonable attorney’s fees where the parties’ contract so provides.330  Courts 
addressing this issue determined that the PACA undercuts buyers’ unreasonable 
surprise argument.331  In five cases, the non-assenting party (the buyer) failed to 
present any evidence in support of their claim of or to plead surprise or 
hardship.332 
Course of dealing figured prominently in four cases rejecting buyers’ 
arguments that an attorney’s fee provision was a material alteration.333  In 
                                                 
 327. See, e.g., Rocheux Int’l of N.J., Inc. v. U.S Merchants Fin. Grp. Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 651, 
683–84 (D.N.J. 2010) (establishing that the seller’s sending of hundreds of invoices containing an 
interest clause constituted a prior course of dealing sufficient to overcome the buyer’s surprise or 
hardship claim); Jada Toys, 2009 WL 3055370, at *8. 
 328. See, e.g., Bounty Fresh, LLC v. Paradise Produce, Inc., No. CV 2009-5577(FB)(MDG), 
2010 WL 3781997, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2010); Argi Exotic Trading, Inc. v. New Man 
Designed Sys., Ltd., 2008 WL 2397565, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2008); Smith & Loveless v. 
Caicos Corp., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1152 (D. Kan. 2007); AFL Fresh & Frozen Fruits & Vegetable, 
Inc. v. De-Mar Food Servs. Inc., No. 06 Civ. 2142(GEL), 2007 WL 4302514, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 2007) (addressing a situation where the buyer failed to raise issue of material alteration); Serge 
Dore’ Selections Ltd. v. Universal Wines and Spirits, 20 Misc. 3d 1121(A), No.23509/2007, at *12 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (finding that a buyer cannot establish surprise when they  previously signed 
an invoice containing a provision providing for attorney’s fees). 
 329. See Tomato, 2014 WL 2893368 at *2; Palmareal Produce Corp. v. Direct Produce #1, 
Inc., No. 07-CV-1364, 2008 WL 905041, at *3–4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008). 
 330. See, e.g., Coosemans Specialties, Inc. v. Gargiulo, 485 F.3d 701, 709 (2d Cir. 2007); 
Tomato, 2014 WL 2893368, at *2; Hop Hing, 2013 WL 1232919 at *4; Palmareal, 2008 WL 
905041, at *2–3; Ger-Nis, 2008 WL 2704384, at *11–12; (adopting rule articulated in Dayoub that 
a provision calling for attorney’s fees in cases implicating the PACA does not materially alter the 
contract); Dayoub Mktg., Inc. v. S.K. Produce Corp., No. 04 Civ. 3125(WHP), 2005 WL 3006032, 
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2005); Top Banana, L.L.C. v. Dom’s Wholesale & Retail Center, Inc., No. 
04 CV 2666(GBD), 2005 WL 1529736, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2005). 
 331. Coosemans, 485 F.3d at 708–09. 
 332. Coosemans, 485 F.3d at 708; Bounty Fresh, 2010 WL 3781997, at *2–3; Argi, 2008 WL 
2397565, at *3–4; AFL Fresh, 2007 WL 4302514, at *7–8 (buyer failed to raise issue of material 
alteration); Top Banana, 2005 WL 1529736, at *5. 
 333. Bearden v. Great Lakes Produce and Mktg. LLC, No. 1:12-CV-700, 2013 WL 2318857, 
at *3–4 (W.D. Mich. May 28, 2013); Rocheux Int’l of N.J., Inc. v. U.S. Merchants Fin. Grp., Inc., 
741 F. Supp. 2d 651, 683–84 (D.N.J. 2010); Jada Toys, Inc. v. Chicago Import, Inc., No. 07C699, 
2009 WL 3055370, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2009). 
2016] When Does an Additional Term Materially Alter a Contract?  529 
Rocheux Int’l of N.J., Inc. v. U.S. Merchants,334 a seller sought to recover interest 
and attorney’s fees arising from a buyer’s wrongful failure to pay for a 
product.335  The seller asserted it was entitled to recover these expenses based 
on provisions in invoices it sent to the buyer.336  The terms provided for an 18% 
annual interest rate and attorney’s fees equaling 25% of the buyer’s outstanding 
balance.337 
After adopting the surprise or hardship standard and citing to comments four 
and five of section 2-207, the court enumerated several factors that courts 
examine in determining whether including an additional term in a contract would 
constitute an unreasonable surprise.338  These included the parties’ course of 
dealing, industry standards, the conspicuousness of the additional terms in the 
confirmation, and whether the terms appeared in the non-assenting party’s 
standard terms.339  The court found that the seller’s inclusion of the disputed 
terms in hundreds of invoices and credit memos over a six-year period was 
sufficient to establish a course of dealing and to counter the buyer’s surprise 
argument.340  The court in Bearden v. Great Lakes Produce and Marketing 
LLC341 articulated the four factors expressed in Rocheux to determine whether 
an attorney’s fee clause was a material alteration.342  In concluding the clause 
had not materially altered, the court noted that the buyer had failed to “establish 
that there is an absence of industry custom” of seller’s including attorney’s fee 
provisions in their forms.343 
Few cases addressed the question of whether an attorney’s fees provision 
gives rise to an undue hardship.344  One of the more extensive discussions of this 
issue occurred in Rocheux.345  There, the court acknowledged the cases in which 
courts have ruled that hardship is not an independent ground for finding a 
material alteration.346  Finding the reasoning underlying this view to be 
persuasive, the court proceeded to address whether including the interest and 
                                                 
 334. 741 F. Supp. 2d 651 (D.N.J. 2010). 
 335. Id. at 658. 
 336. Id. at 658–59. 
 337. Id. at 681. 
 338. See id. at 682. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. at 683. 
 341. No. 1:12-CV-700, 2013 WL 2318857 (W.D. Mich. May 28, 2013). 
 342. Id. at *3. 
 343. Id. at *4. 
 344. See Bearden, 2013 WL 2318857, at *6 (“[A]ttorney’s fees may impose . . . some 
economic hardship, but economic hardship is not equivalent to an undue hardship.”); Rocheux, 741 
F. Supp. 2d at 684–85, 687; Dayoub Mktg., Inc. v. S.K. Produce Corp., No. 04 Civ. 3125 (WHP), 
2005 WL 3006032, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2005) (finding that collection costs, including 
interest on unpaid balances and attorney’s fees, did not constitute an undue hardship; the court 
reduced the seller’s recovery of attorney’s fees to an amount that was reasonable). 
 345. See Rocheux, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 684. 
 346. Id. 
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attorney’s fee clause was a material alteration.347  In rejecting the buyer’s 
argument that the 18% interest rate exceeded the 16% rate imposed by the usury 
statute, the court concluded the rate did not substantially exceed the 16% usury 
rate and buyer’s presented no evidence it was outside the range of interest 
charged in the trade.348  The court also noted section 2-207’s comment five.  
Turning to the attorney’s fee provision, the court found that given the protracted 
nature of the litigation between the parties, it could not conclude that the 25% 
rate would be more onerous than if the term had merely called for the award of 
reasonable attorney’s fees.349  Thus, the buyer had not established hardship to 
support that the provision materially altered the contract.350  In another case 
discussing course of dealing, interest and attorney’s fee provisions in hundreds 
of invoices sent by the seller over several years supported a court’s finding of 
no surprise.351 
In only two of the cases surveyed did courts find that an attorney’s fees 
provision constituted a material alteration.352  In A.E. Robinson Oil Co. v. County 
Forest Prods. Inc.,353 the seller’s inclusion of an interest provision on its 
invoices over several years was determined to be a course of dealing that 
supported including the provision in the parties’ contract.354  The court held, 
however, that the attorney’s fees clause was a material alteration.355  This was 
based on the absence of evidence of course of dealing because the invoices did 
not contain language providing for the recovery of attorney’s fees.356  In Food 
Team Intern, Ltd. v. Unilink, LLC,357 the court found that a provision requiring 
the buyer to pay “all attorneys’ fees,” lacked sufficient qualifying language to 
limit the buyer’s potential exposure and thus was a material alteration.”358 
Unlike the other clauses discussed thus far, courts applied something close to 
a per se approach in finding that pre-judgment interest clauses do not materially 
alter.  While courts were influenced by the language in comment five, the rule 
adopted may be a consequence of courts’ sense that a buyer should reasonably 
expect that it will be responsible for paying pre-judgment interest if it defaults 
                                                 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. at 658. 
 349. Id. at 686–87. 
 350. Id. 
 351. See Jada Toys, Inc. v. Chicago Import, Inc., No. 07C699, 2009 WL 3055370, at *8–9 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2009). 
 352. See Food Team Int’l, Ltd. v. Unilink, LLC, 872 F. Supp. 2d 504, 420–21 (E.D. Pa. 2012); 
A.E. Robinson Oil Co. v. County Forest Prods. Inc., 40 A.3d 20, 23–24 (Me. 2012). 
 353. 40 A.3d 20 (Me. 2012). 
 354. Id. at 23 (determining that comment five supported the conclusion that an interest charge 
provision did not materially alter the parties contract). 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. at 23–24. 
 357. 872 F. Supp. 2d 405 (E.D. Pa. 2012). 
 358. Food Team Int’l, Ltd. v. Unilink, LLC, 872 F. Supp. 2d 405, 421–22 (E.D. Pa. 2012). 
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in its obligation to pay for goods delivered.359  Although courts are less likely to 
adopt a per se approach in regard to attorney’s fees, here too they may be 
influenced by the belief that the obligation to pay costs of collection, upon 
default, is not something that should surprise a buyer. 
E.  Forum Selection Clauses 
Parties often include clauses in their documents that stipulate the venue in 
which a matter will be adjudicated in the event of a dispute.  The following is an 
example of a forum selection clause that appeared in a seller’s document, titled 
as a sales contract, which accepted a buyer’s offer to purchase: “Buyer agrees 
that any dispute arising out of this agreement shall be resolved in the Superior 
Court of New Jersey, Camden County, or the Federal District Court for the 
District of New Jersey and buyer does agree to submit generally to the 
jurisdiction of these courts.”360 
This survey identified thirty cases decided over the last decade in which courts 
determined whether a forum selection clause constitutes a material alteration.  In 
all but seven of the cases reviewed, courts found that a forum selection clause 
was an additional term that materially altered the parties’ contract and, therefore, 
refused to permit it to become a term of the agreement. 
1.  Forum Selection Clause Does Not Materially Alter 
Course of dealing played a role in cases in which courts found that a forum 
selection clause did not materially alter the contract.  In Bell, Inc. v. IFS 
Industries, Inc.,361 over an eight-year period, the seller repeatedly sent invoices 
that included terms and conditions containing a forum selection clause to which 
the buyer did not object, which established a course of dealing that overcame the 
buyer’s materiality argument.362  Likewise, in CFMOTO Powersports Inc. v. 
NNR Global Logistics USA, Inc.,363 TSR Silicon Resources, Inc. v. Broadway 
Com Corp.364, and Liquid Magnetix Corp. v. Therma-Stor LLC365, the sellers’ 
repeated sending of forms containing forum selection clauses created a course 
of dealing sufficient to rebut the buyers’ materiality arguments.366 In cases in 
                                                 
 359. See, e.g., Rocheux Int’l of N.J., Inc. v. U.S. Merchants Fin. Grp., Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 
651, 685–86 (D.N.J. 2010). 
 360. Metro. Alloys Corp. v. State Metals Indus., 416 F. Supp. 2d 561, 565 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
 361. 742 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (D.S.D. 2010). 
 362. See id. at 1053. 
 363. No. 09-2202(JRT/JJK), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113058 (D. Minn. Dec. 4, 2009). 
 364. No. 9419(NRB), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92121 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2007). 
 365. No. 12-CV-3151-WJM-KMT, 2014 WL 1389984 (D. Colo. Apr. 9, 2014). 
 366. Liquid Magnetix, 2014 WL 1389984, at *2, *4 (twelve invoices established a course of 
dealing); CFMOTO Powersports, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113058, at *14–18  (finding that terms 
and conditions attached to 224 invoices, each of which contained a forum selection clause, 
established course of dealing); TSR Silicon Resources, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92121, at *11–12 
(75 seller’s invoices, which included a forum selection clause sent to a buyer over a five-year 
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which courts found that forum selection clauses materially alter contracts, courts 
suggested that they would have reached a different result if a prior course of 
dealing was present.367 
In Quality Wood Designs, Inc. v. Ex-Factory, Inc.,368 course of dealing was 
one of several factors369 the court identified as important in determining whether 
a forum selection clause constituted a surprise or hardship that would give rise 
to a material alteration.370  Adopting this fact-based approach, the court found 
there was no course of dealing.371  Nevertheless, it concluded the forum selection 
clause was not a material alteration.372  The court relied on the following facts 
in concluding that the buyer should not have been surprised by the provision: 
the seller sent an invoice containing the forum selection clause to the buyer’s 
president the day after the oral agreement was made; the conspicuousness of the 
relevant terms and conditions; and the buyer’s failure to object to the clause 
despite objecting to other terms.373  As for hardship, the court concluded it refers 
to “something other than a debate over the advantage of one’s home forum or 
convenience of litigation in one’s home state.”374  In addition, the court found 
that the buyer could foresee that any dispute between the parties could be 
litigated in either North Carolina or South Dakota.375  In another case, in which 
a court concluded a forum selection clause did not materially alter the contract, 
the court found that the buyer’s assent to the forms containing the forum 
selection clauses defeated any materiality argument.376 
2.  Forum Selection Clause Materially Alters 
In contrast to arbitration, warranty disclaimer, limited remedy and attorney’s 
fee provisions, courts assessing the materiality of forum selection clauses rarely 
discussed the surprise or hardship standard.  Rather, they took an approach 
                                                 
period, established a course of dealing that placed the buyer on notice and rebutted its claim that 
the forum selection clause materially altered the parties’ contract). 
 367. Ben-Trei Overseas, LLC v. Gerdau Ameristeel US, Inc., No. 09-CV-153-TCK-TLW, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11792, at *14, *19 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 10, 2010); Vanlab Corp. v. Blossom 
Valley Foods Corp., 04-CV-6183, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10869, at *6–9 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 
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 368. 40 F. Supp. 3d 1137 (D.S.D. 2014). 
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 371. Id. at 1150–51. 
 372. Id. 
 373. Id. 
 374. Id. at 1153. 
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 376. See Highland Supply Corp. v. Kurt Weiss Greenhouses, Inc, No. 08-859-GPM, 2009 WL 
2365244, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2009); see also Hardwire, LCC v. Zero Int’l., Inc., No. 14-54-
LPS-CJB, 2014 WL 5144610, at *12–13 (D. Del. Oct. 14, 2014) (finding that a forum selection 
clause did not materially alter the contract because section 2-207(1) instead of section 2-207(2)(b) 
was applicable where the clause was in the offer). 
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similar to that adopted by courts in assessing the materiality of interest clauses, 
but reached the opposite conclusion in summarily accepting the non-assenting 
party’s argument that a forum selection clause constitutes a material alteration.  
Most courts simply restated what was cast as the majority rule and turned to 
precedent in concluding, with cursory discussion, that a forum selection clause 
constitutes a material alteration.377  The paucity of analysis is exemplified by 
courts’ tendencies in several cases to not even articulate surprise or hardship as 
the applicable test.378 
A facts-based approach, however, was applied in Duro Textiles, LLC v. 
Sunbelt Corp.379 where the court concluded the forum selection clause materially 
altered the contract.380  In a few instances, courts also articulated a rationale for 
finding that a forum selection clause is a material alteration.381  This occurred in 
Metropolitan Alloys Corp. v. State Metal Industries, Inc.,382 where the court 
stated a rationale that suggests materiality is derived from hardship: 
There are still subtle differences between the courts in various states.  
Certainly the jurors are selected from different economic, political and 
social backgrounds, which may affect their attitudes even in 
commercial matters.  Counsel other than the party’s regular attorney 
may be needed, at additional expense.  The bench and bar has always 
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Mich. 2006); C. Mahendra (NY), LLC v. Nat’l Gold & Diamond Ctr., Inc., 3 N.Y.S.3d 27, 30 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2015); Tacoma Fixture Co., Inc. v. Rudd Co., 174 P.3d 721, 724–25 n.4 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2008); Posh Pooch, Inc. v. Argenti, 11 Misc. 3d 1055(A), No. 106419/2005, slip op. at 2–3 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2006); Lively v. Ijam, Inc., 114 P.3d 487, 493 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005); see also Office 
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regarded choice of forum as a significant right.  The Court, as a matter 
of common sense would regard the injection of a choice of forum 
clause as a proposal for a material alteration in the contact, and 
believes that while the argument is not as strong as in the case of an 
arbitration clause, the rationale is the same.383 
The Metropolitan court’s reference to arbitration provisions is troublesome 
because it, like other cases finding that a forum selection clause materially alters 
a contract, relies on precedent that analogized forum selection clauses to 
arbitration provisions, which at the time were more likely than not to be viewed 
as material alterations.384  The court’s reliance on such precedent seems 
unwarranted particularly given the shift in analysis concerning the materiality of 
arbitration provisions.385 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Likely, section 2-207 will continue to mystify and be the object of derision.  
Yet over the past decade, judicial developments regarding what constitutes a 
material alteration may have furthered Section 2-207(2)(b)’s purpose—
preventing a party’s use of an additional term in its standardized form to 
reallocate risks beyond those proposed in the offer and thus not binding a party 
to terms it could not reasonably have expected to be a term of their contract.386  
This has been realized through the judiciary’s increased willingness to adopt a 
facts-based rather than a per se approach to assess the materiality of additional 
terms—a welcome departure by many courts from strict adherence to the 
examples set forth in official comments four and five to determine when an 
additional term constitutes a material alteration.  This approach allows courts to 
examine the peculiarities of each case to determine if a clause materially alters 
based on both the subjective or objective circumstances surrounding the 
transaction and to permit the inclusion of terms that are fair and that conform to 
the probable intentions of parties who don’t necessarily read the boilerplate 
terms of the other party’s forms.387 
Nevertheless, concerns remain, including deciding in which instances 
repeated use of a term in documents constitutes a course of dealing and the 
frequency of per se determinations regarding the materiality of forum selection 
clauses.  Currently too many courts’ appear predisposed to assume a course of 
dealing based simply on the party’s repeated sending of forms containing the 
disputed additional term.  Moreover, courts’ frequent failure to engage in a fact-
rich examination of forum selection clauses undermines efforts to determine if 
                                                 
 383. Id. at 567. 
 384. See, e.g., Posh Pooch, Inc. v. Argenti, 11 Misc. 3d 1055(A), No. 106419/2005, slip. op. 
at 2–3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (finding the forum selection clause as a material alteration, the court 
relied on a 1978 case, in which a court found that an arbitration provision was a material alteration). 
 385. See supra discussion accompanying notes 163–225. 
 386. Murray, supra note 92, at 46. 
 387. See Brown, supra note 53, at 935, 937–38. 
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a non-assenting party would genuinely be surprised or suffer the adverse 
economic consequence that represent hardship if such a provision is included in 
the party’s agreement.  Notwithstanding such shortcomings, courts’ willingness 
over the past decade to alter their approach to questions involving section 2-
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